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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Supreme Court pursuant to a writ
of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review a decision
regarding the relinquishment and adoptive placement of an infant
born out of wedlock.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that

L.D.S. Social Services engaged in "state action" by accepting
custody of an infant born out of wedlock and placing the infant
for adoption.
2.

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the

distinction between the rights of unwed mothers and fathers in
U.C.A. § 78-30-4 is valid under the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution.
3.

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that

U.C.A. § 78-30-4(3) adequately protected plaintiff's due process
rights.
4.

Whether plaintiff may raise the issue of adoption by

acknowledgment for the first time in the Supreme Court.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW
The following statutory and constitutional provisions are
set out verbatim in the Addendum (Add. 45-46):
1.

U.C.A. §§ 78-30-4 and 78-30-12;

2.

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1;

3.

Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7.

-1-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by the putative father of an
illegitimate infant challenging the constitutionality of U.C.A.
§ 78-30-4, pursuant to which the mother relinquished the infant
for adoption and the father's paternal rights were terminated.
(R. 2; Court of Appeals Opinion, hereafter "Slip Op.," at 1,
Add. 1.)

Plaintiff initially filed this action in the United

States District Court for the District of Utah.

Following

discovery and a hearing, the federal court denied plaintiff's
motion for preliminary injunction to obtain immediate custody of
the child and granted defendants' motion to dismiss on
abstention grounds.

(Slip Op., Add. 4-5; Swayne v. L.D.S.

Social Services, 670 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1987).)
Plaintiff refiled the action in state district court.
Following further discovery and an evidentiary hearing, the
state court denied plaintiff's renewed motion for preliminary
injunction and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.
(Slip Op., Add. 5; Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, hereafter "Findings,"
R. 68, Add. 17; Judgment, R. 190, Add. 21.)
Plaintiff appealed the summary judgment and moved for
summary reversal and an injunction for custody pending appeal.
A law and motion panel of the Court of Appeals denied both
motions, following briefing and a hearing, and set the matter
for expedited briefing and argument on the merits.
23-24.)

(Add.

A different panel of the Court of Appeals subsequently

reversed the district court's holding of no state action, but
-2-

upheld the constitutionality of section 78-30-4, on its face and
as applied to plaintiff.

(Slip Op., Add. 7-16.) The Court of

Appeals Opinion is officially reported as Swayne v. L.D.S.
Social Services, 761 P.2d 932 (Utah App. 1988).
Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review
the Court of Appeals rulings on the constitutional issues, and
defendants subsequently cross-petitioned for review of the state
action ruling.
16, 1989.

This Court granted both petitions on February

(Add. 25.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff is a 22-year-old single black man who, at all
times relevant to this action, has resided in an apartment in
Salt Lake County.

In late 1985 he began dating P., a

20-year-old single white woman who, at all times relevant to
this action, has resided at her parents' home in Salt Lake
County.

Throughout the time plaintiff dated P., before and

during the pregnancy, and even after the baby's birth, plaintiff
continued to date and engage in sexual relations with other
women.

Yet, because of plaintiff's unstable financial

circumstances, P. often paid his rent and living expenses and
loaned him her car for up to four or five days a week.

(Slip

Op., Add. 1; I Tr. 8, 24-25, 30, 38-39; Swayne Dep., R. 109, pp.
3-16, 22-25; Paxman Aff't, R. 96, 1! 1-2, 5, Add. 32-33;
Findings, U1F 1-2, Add. 18.)

HJ Tr." refers to the transcript of the first part of
the state preliminary injunction hearing, identified as R. 203,
and "II Tr." will refer to the separately bound transcript of
the second part of the same hearing, identified as R. 204.
-3-

When plaintiff learned in October of 1986 that P. was
pregnant, he became angry and, until March of 1987, denied that
the baby was his.

Plaintiff refused to marry P. because "[i]t

didn't appeal" to him.

In fact, at no time prior to

relinquishment of the baby to LDS Social Services did plaintiff
ever offer to marry P. or to live with and support her and the
baby-

Even after the relinquishment, when plaintiff proposed a

secret "paper" marriage to enhance his court case, he still
wanted to live apart from P., so she refused.

(Slip Op., Add.

1-2; I Tr. 9, 25-28; Paxman Aff't HU 2, 4, Add. 32-33; Swayne
Dep. 26, 31-32; Findings Hlf 3-4, Add. 18.)
P. discussed with plaintiff during the pregnancy the
possibility of placing the baby for adoption, explaining that
her parents favored adoption because of the baby's racial mix
and the couple's racial and religious incompatibility.

In fact,

P. called and made an appointment with LDS Social Services in
March of 1987 to discuss adoption, but later decided to postpone
the appointment.

P. never told plaintiff that she would not

relinquish the baby for adoption.

Plaintiff told P. that

adoption should be her decision, but suggested to P. that if she
kept the baby she and the baby could live with his mother in the
mother's apartment if she supported herself and the baby and
paid half the rent.

(Slip Op., Add. 2; I Tr. 10, 28-30; II Tr.

16-17; Paxman Aff't Ml 3-4, Add. 32-33; Swayne Dep. 33-34,
54-55; Findings IF 5, Add. 18.)
The baby was born in a Salt Lake City hospital on June 4,
1987.

Plaintiff was present in the hospital at the time of the
_4_

birth and visited P. and the baby in the hospital.

Hospital

personnel explained to P. that the father's name could not be
entered on the birth certificate unless he signed an
acknowledgment of paternity form supplied by the hospital.

P.

informed plaintiff of the acknowledgment requirement and showed
him the form, but he refused to sign it.

Consequently, the

baby's birth certificate shows no father, and the baby was given
P.'s surname.

P.'s mother assumed financial responsibility for

the hospital and doctor expenses and took P. and the baby from
the hospital to their home on June 6.

Plaintiff paid none of

the medical expenses, except for one $45.00 prenatal checkup,
and has assumed no responsibility for the subsequent support of
P. and the baby.

(Slip Op., Add. 2-3; Paxman Aff't U 6, Add.

33-34; Brockert Aff't, R. 105, Add. 41; I Tr. 31-34; II Tr.
17-18, 38; Findings HH 6-8, Add. 18-19.)
On the afternoon of Monday, June 8, 1987, P. took the
baby and, with her parents, met with a counselor from LDS Social
Services regarding possible placement of the baby for adoption.
P. told the counselor that the baby's father had no interest in
marriage nor in living with and supporting her and the baby.
The counselor discussed the available options with P., stressed
that P. should do what she thought best for herself and the
baby, and even offered temporary foster care for the baby until
P. made her decision.

P. considered and weighed all the

circumstances, including plaintiff's lack of commitment to her
and the baby; his continued involvement with other women; the
fact that he had previously fathered a baby out of wedlock and
-5-

consented to its adoption; her inability to support and rear the
baby alone; the problems of bringing a racially-mixed baby into
a possible marriage with another man; and future visitation
rights, and concluded that adoption would be in the baby's best
interests.

The counselor telephoned the Bureau of Vital

Statistics of the Utah Department of Health and determined that
no claim of paternity had been registered for P.'s baby,

P.

then read the "Affidavit and Release" form with the counselor,
stated that she understood its legal significance, and signed
it, voluntarily transferring legal custody and control of the
baby to LDS Social Services for adoption.

Because of the

lateness of the hour, the counselor permitted P. to take the
baby home that night, and she returned the baby the next day.
LDS Social Services placed the baby with its adoptive parents on
June 12, 1987.

(Slip Op., Add. 3-4; Paxman Aff't 1W 7-9, Add.

34-35; Bowen Aff't, R. 101, Add. 37; I Tr. 13-15, 31-41; II Tr.
2-4; Swayne Dep. 11-17; Findings U 9, Add. 19.)
Plaintiff places great emphasis on events that occurred
after P. relinquished legal custody of the baby to LDS Social
Services.

While those events are immaterial (Slip Op., Add.

15), a response is required to correct the record.

On Tuesday,

June 9, before returning the baby to LDS Social Services that
afternoon, P. took the baby to plaintiff's apartment for a short
visit.

While P. and the baby were there, one of plaintiff's

other girlfriends also dropped in for a visit.

Contrary to

plaintiff's representation (Brief of Pet. at 3), there is no
evidence in the record of any other visit of P. and the baby to
-6-

his apartment.

(I Tr. 15, 42-43.)

Plaintiff also claims that

P. called him "repeatedly" from California and deceived him
regarding the baby.

(Brief of Pet. at 4.)

The only calls were

on Wednesday and Saturday, June 10 and 13. More importantly,
the reason P. delayed telling plaintiff that she had
relinquished the baby was that she feared he would be angry and
do physical harm to her and her family.

(Slip Op., Add. 4; I

Tr. 15-16, 44-49.)
After learning of the relinquishment, plaintiff
registered a belated claim of paternity on June 15, 1987 and
attempted to amend the birth certificate to add his name.
However, plaintiff has testified that if he were to obtain
custody of the child, he would give the child to his sister "to
raise" until some indefinite time when he might become "more
stable."

(Slip Op., Add. 1, 11; I Tr. 17-18; Swayne Dep. 28-30;

Findings 1[ 12, Add. 19.)
Plaintiff filed suit, alleging two "causes of action."
The first requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
violation of federal constitutional rights under color of state
law, and the second seeks a declaratory judgment that U.C.A.
§ 78-30-4, facially and as applied, violates the equal
protection and due process provisions of the federal and state
constitutions.

(R. 2-5, Add. 26-29.)

The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction, concluding that success on the merits
was unlikely because, among other findings:

-7-

13. It was not impossible for plaintiff to have
filed his notice of claim of paternity prior to the date
the child was relinquished for adoption.
14. Throughout the pregnancy, plaintiff did not
behave in a manner consistent with that of a concerned,
committed father, nor did he clearly articulate an intent
to keep and rear the child. [R. 70, Add. 19.]
The district court subsequently granted defendants summary
judgment, concluding that there was no "state action" to support
the civil rights and constitutional claims, and that section
78-30-4 is constitutionally valid on its face and as applied in
this case.

(R. 190-91, Add. 21-22.)

As noted, the Court of Appeals denied plaintiff's motions
for summary reversal and injunction pending appeal.
23-24.)

(Add.

On the merits the Court of Appeals reversed the holding

of no state action, but affirmed the constitutionality of the
statute under the federal equal protection clause and the
federal and state due process provisions.

(Slip Op., Add. 1-16.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff abandoned the state action issue by failing to
raise it in his Docketing Statement or opening brief to the
Court of Appeals.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in

reviewing the state action ruling rendered by the district
court.

In any event, LDS Social Services did not engage in

state action by accepting relinquishment of the child from the
mother and placing the child with adoptive parents.

The state

was not significantly involved in the relinquishment and
adoptive placement; LDS Social Services was not performing a
traditional state function; and LDS Social Services did not
"terminate" plaintiff's inchoate paternal rights. Therefore,

the conduct of LDS Social Services was not "state action," and
plaintiff accordingly has no basis to challenge the
constitutionality of 78-30-4 as applied.
Section 78-30-4 does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution by requiring the
mother's consent for adoption of her illegitimate child while
conditioning the father's right of consent on his timely
registration of paternity.

Inherent differences in the unwed

parents' relative situations with respect to the newborn child
justify significant variations in their respective parental
rights and require a rule that gives the mother the exclusive
right to consent to the child's adoption.

The decisions of this

Court and the United States Supreme Court hold that such a
statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to achieve the state's
compelling interest in prompt and final determinations regarding
the care of illegitimate newborns.

Paternal consent to the

adoption of illegitimate newborns would undermine the public
policy behind the statute by threatening the mother's right of
privacy, complicating and delaying the adoption process, or
deterring adoption altogether.

Plaintiff assumed no

responsibility for, and developed no relationship with, the
child.

Therefore, equal protection does not require that he be

accorded rights similar to those of the mother.
Section 78-30-4(3) operated consistent with the demands
of due process because it adequately protected plaintiff's
opportunity to develop a relationship with the child.

Plaintiff

had notice of the pregnancy, as well as of the time and place of
-9-

birth; therefore, he reasonably could have protected his rights
through marriage or registration of paternity.

Because

plaintiff's relationship with the child was purely biological,
due process does not require that he be afforded a
pretermination hearing.
Finally, plaintiff's argument that he adopted the child
by acknowledgment was neither raised nor decided in the lower
courts; therefore, the issue may not be raised in this Court.
In any event, the facts in no way support adoption by
acknowledgment.
ARGUMENT
Analysis of the state action and constitutional issues
should be preceded by a review of the framework and operation of
the challenged statute, U.C.A. § 78-30-4.

(See Add. 46.) This

statute governs the adoption of illegitimate children in Utah.
Subsection (1) requires "the consent of each living parent
having rights in relation to [the] child," unless the parent or
parents have previously "released his or her or their control or
custody of such child" to a licensed child placement agency.
Subsection (3)(a) provides that "the father of an illegitimate
child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child
by registering with the registrar of vital statistics in the
department of health, a notice of his claim of paternity . . .
and of his willingness and intent to support the child to the
best of his ability."

Subsection (3)(b) states that the notice

may be registered at any time prior to the birth, but must be
registered prior to the date the child is relinquished to an
-10-

adoption agency or, in the case of a private adoption, before
the filing of an adoption petition.

Subsection (3)(c) makes

clear that if the father timely registers his claim of
paternity, his rights are fully protected and adoption of the
child may not proceed without his consent.

If the father fails

to timely register his claim of paternity, the mother may
relinquish the child for adoption without notice to or consent
of the father, and the father is thereafter barred from
asserting his paternity.

See Wells v. Children's Aid Society,

681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984) (explaining operation and
reaffirming constitutionality of the statute).
POINT I:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REACHING THE STATE
ACTION ISSUE AND IN DECIDING THAT LDS SOCIAL
SERVICES ENGAGED IN STATE ACTION.

Abandonment of State Action Issue
Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

deprivation of federal constitutional rights under color of
state law, as well as a declaration of state constitutional
violations.

(Complaint, R. 4-5, Add. 28-29.)

Defendants

asserted the defense that they are purely private, nonpublic
entities whose actions do not constitute "state action" subject
to challenge under the cited civil rights and constitutional
provisions.

(Answer U8, R. 27.)

Both parties briefed the state

action issue in the district court, which concluded there was no
state action:
The challenged acts of defendants do not constitute
state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under the due
process and equal protection provisions of either the
United States Constitution or the Utah Constitution.
[Add. 22.]
-11-

Plaintiff's Docketing Statement did not identify state
action as an issue on appeal, and his opening brief to the Court
of Appeals failed to challenge or even mention the district
court's holding of no state action.

Accordingly, defendants

argued in their response brief that plaintiff had abandoned the
state action issue and, therefore, that the Court of Appeals
could not alter the district court's ruling.
of App. at 10.)

(Resp. Br. to Ct.

By ignoring that argument and addressing the

state action issue after it had been abandoned by plaintiff, the
Court of Appeals committed reversible error.

See, e.g.,

Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah
1983); Brubaker v. Branine, 237 Kan. 488, 701 P.2d 929, 931
(1985); Sanchez v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 681 P.2d
974, 976 (Colo. App. 1984).
B.

Merits of State Action Issue
It has been long settled that the due process and equal

protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only to
"state action," not to acts of private persons or entities.
Rende11-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982).

Likewise 42

U.S.C. § 1983, which was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, applies only to deprivation of federal constitutional
rights "under color of state law."

Id. at 838.

The statutory

"under color of state law" requirement is construed as
equivalent to the "state action" element of the Fourteenth
Amendment,

id.

Thus, the sum test for relief under section

1983 is as follows:
The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is
subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question posed
-12-

in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment:
alleged infringement of federal rights "fairly
attributable to the State?" [Id.]

is the

If the challenged action is not "state action," this Court need
not reach the merits of the constitutional claims.

Id.

The corresponding state constitutional provisions are
also limited in application to "state action."

See Hulbert v.

State, 607 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Utah 1980) ("these provisions were
designed to protect the individual from state action"); Gray v.
Department of Employment Sec., 681 P.2d 807, 816 (Utah 1984);
see also Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. Industrial Comm'n,
649 P.2d 33, 35-36 (Utah 1982) (construction of federal
constitution persuasive in applying state constitution).
In determining whether the action of a private entity is
attributable to the state, courts look at the degree of state
involvement in the challenged action.

For example, in

Rendell-Baker the U.S. Supreme Court held that a nonprofit,
private school's discharge of certain employees did not
constitute state action because the function performed was not
"traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State," and
there was no "symbiotic relationship" between the school and the
state.

457 U.S. at 842.

It did not matter that the school was

regulated and largely funded by the state,

id. at 840-41.

Similarly, in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), the Court
held that a private nursing home's decision to transfer Medicaid
patients to lower levels of care did not constitute state action
because provision of nursing homes is not a traditional state
function, and state regulation and review of the decision could
-13-

not be regarded as state approval of or participation in the
transfer.

Id. at 1005-11.

See also Benavidez v. Gunnell, 722

F.2d 615, 618 (10th Cir. 1983) (conduct of LDS Social Services
representatives does not constitute state action under section
1983);

Ward v. St. Anthony Hospital, 476 F.2d 671, 675 (10th

Cir. 1973) (state must be involved in the activity that caused
the alleged injury); Larsen v. Kirkham, 499 F. Supp. 960, 962-64
(D. Utah 1980) (no state action by LDS Business College in
dismissing teacher pursuant to statute permitting religious
discrimination).
In this case the Court of Appeals found state action by
following the flawed analysis employed by the federal court in
Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 670 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah
1987).

(Slip Op., Add. 6.)

To begin with, both courts relied

on the two-step analysis set forth in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), which focuses on whether the alleged
deprivation was caused by the exercise of a state-created right,
and on whether the defendant was a "state actor."

Lugar held

that a private creditor, acting with state officials pursuant to
state garnishment and attachment laws, engaged in state action.
That analysis, however, has no application to cases involving
private entities engaged in traditionally private functions,
without state assistance, as evidenced by the distinct analysis
employed in Rendell-Baker and Blum, supra, which were decided
the same day as Lugar.

The Court of Appeals held that the Lugar

test was satisfied because "the State was responsible for the
statute," and LDS Social Services acted for the state "in
-14-

terminating appellant's parental rights."
6-7.)

(Slip Op., Add.

That holding is contrary to both law and reason.
As a different panel of the Court of Appeals held in

Dirks v. Cornwell, 754 P.2d 946, 950-51 (Utah App. 1988), the
fact that a procedural scheme is created by the state does not
convert private parties who follow the scheme into "state
machinery."

Otherwise, "virtually all formal private

arrangements" entered into pursuant to state law would be
"subject to judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 951, quoting Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 268,
578 P.2d 925, 932 (1978).

A statutory enactment may serve as a

basis for finding state action only when the enactment alters
existing law so as to authorize previously unlawful action.

See

Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967) (California statute
repealing prohibition of racial discrimination in housing).

For

example, in Larsen v. Kirkham, supra, dismissal of the teacher
pursuant to the statute permitting religious discrimination did
not constitute state action because the statute vested LDS
Business College with no more freedom to discriminate than it
possessed under common law.

499 F. Supp. at 964.

Likewise, section 78-30-4 renders paternal rights of
unwed fathers no more subject to termination than they were at
common law.

In fact, at common law "there was no legally

recognized relationship between a putative father and his
illegitimate child."

Comment, "Delineation of the Boundaries of

Putative Fathers1 Rights:

A Psychological Parenthood

Perspective," 15 Seton Hall L. Rev. 290, 294-95 (1985).
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Accordingly, the statute does not authorize anything that was
previously impermissible; if anything, the statute accords unwed
fathers more rights than before.

LDS Social Services did

nothing that it could not have done prior to the statute.

Its

right to accept custody of illegitimate children was not
state-created, but has traditionally been a function of private
entities; therefore, its exercise of that right cannot be
regarded as state action.
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that LDS Social Services
"terminated" plaintiff's paternal rights is also in error.

To

begin with, as the court later noted, an unwed father does not
have fully vested parental rights until he timely registers his
acknowledgment of paternity.

(Slip Op., Add. 12.)

Until that

time his rights remain "provisional," Wells, supra, at 206, or
"inchoate," Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983).
Moreover, the adoption agency does not "terminate" an unwed
father's rights by accepting the relinquishment of his child;
rather, the father himself forfeits, or "surrender[s] [those
rights] pursuant to statute" by failing timely to register his
claim of paternity.

Wells, supra, at 202.

The unwed father's

rights are not formally terminated until entry of the adoption
order.

See U.C.A. §§ 78-30-9 and -11.

In short, the adoption

agency is not rendered a "state actor" by the forfeiture that
results from the father's own inaction.
Neither may support for the Court of Appeals' state
action ruling be found in the precedents of this Court.

If

state action was "assumed" in the prior cases dealing with
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78-30-4 (Slip Op., Add, 6), it was because the issue had not
been raised by the parties, not because state action was
present.

As noted by the Court in Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social

Services, 680 P.2d 753, 755 n.2 (Utah 1984), a private adoption
agency1s conduct under 78-30-4 "does not constitute state
action."

See also In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686,

695 (Utah 1986) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Due process limits
state action, not the actions of private parties.").

Other

jurisdictions also recognize that the actions of private persons
involved in the adoption of an illegitimate infant are not
subject to constitutional challenge by the unwed father.

See,

e.g., In re Petition of Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942,
945-46 (1986) (mother's concealment of adoption did not
constitute state action).
Under proper state action analysis, as set forth in
Rendell-Baker and Blum, LDS Social Services did not engage in
state action because the state was not involved to a significant
degree in the relinquishment and adoptive placement of P.'s
baby.

As the Court of Appeals acknowledged, LDS Social Services

receives no state funding, and its internal decisions regarding
acceptance and placement of illegitimate infants is not subject
to state control.
30.)

(Slip Op., Add. 6; Brown Aff't, R. 94, Add.

Moreover, LDS Social Services was not performing a

function that has been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative
of the State."

Rendell-Baker, supra, at 842. While the

termination of fully vested parental rights has traditionally
been the function of the state, adoptive placement of
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illegitimate infants, which may result in the forfeiture of
inchoate paternal rights, has historically fallen to private
agencies.

See Presser, "The Historical Background of the

American Law of Adoption," 11 J. Fam. L. 443 (1971).
Accordingly, there is no legal basis for the Court of Appeals
holding that plaintiff's alleged injury was the result of state
action by LDS Social Services.

Enforcement of the state action

doctrine in this case would put an end to the case-by-case
scrutiny of private actions taken during the adoption process,
of which the Court forewarned in Sanchez, supra, at 755, and
properly limit the Court's inquiry to the facial
constitutionality of the statute and private parties' compliance
with the statute.
POINT II:

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE RIGHTS OF UNWED MOTHERS AND
FATHERS IN U.C.A. § 78-30-4 IS VALID UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

Plaintiff argues that 78-30-4 violates the federal equal
protection provision by granting the mother of an illegitimate
child the right to consent to the child's adoption, while
according the child's father the same right only if he timely
registers an acknowledgment of paternity.

He asserts that while

the objective of the statute is valid, its gender-based
distinction does not further that purpose, and actually defeats
its purpose by protecting "unwilling," "irresponsible" mothers
and excluding "willing," "responsible" fathers.

(Brief of Pet.

at 6-10.) Plaintiff's equal protection argument must be
rejected on the grounds that:

(1) mothers and fathers of
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illegitimate infants are not similarly situated with respect to
the child; (2) controlling precedents hold that the differences
between unwed parents of newborns justify the statutory
distinction; (3) public policies and privacy interests
underlying the statute require the distinction;

and (4) there

is no evidence that plaintiff falls into the class of "willing
and responsible" fathers.
A.

Basis For Different Treatment of Unwed Mothers And Fathers
Equal protection embodies the general principle that

"persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and
persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if
their circumstances were the same."

Maian v. Lewis, 693 P.2d

661, 669 (Utah 1984); see also Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233,
243 (Utah 1979).

When men and women are not in fact similarly

situated in the area covered by the legislation in question,
distinct statutory treatment does not violate equal protection.
See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)
(upholding gender distinctions in military promotion system
because male and female officers are not similarly situated with
respect to service opportunities). A long line of federal and
Utah cases demonstrates that the unwed mother and father of a
newborn child are not similarly situated with respect to the
child and that they, therefore, may be accorded different legal
rights.
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), relied upon by
plaintiff, did not involve the adoption of an illegitimate
newborn.

Caban held that a statute permitting illegitimate
-19-

children to be adopted with the consent of the unwed mother
alone, without according the same right of consent to the unwed
father, violated equal protection as applied to the father of
older children with whom he had developed a substantial
relationship.

There, the parents lived together for five years

and held themselves out as husband and wife; the father was
listed on the children's birth certificates; he lived with the
children as their father for four years; he contributed to the
care and support of the family; and he visited and communicated
with the children even after separating from their mother.
at 382.

Id.

Based on these facts, the Court concluded that the

father's relationship with the children was just as substantial
as the mother's and that the purpose of the statute was
therefore not served by denying the father a voice in the
adoption.

Id. at 393-94.

However, the Caban Court emphasized that the statute's
different treatment of unwed fathers and mothers would be
justified in the case of a newborn illegitimate child because,
while the mother has a substantial relationship with the child,
the father does not.

Legislative distinctions based on the

differences in their respective relationships with the child are
acceptable.

See id. at 389.

As the Caban Court observed:

Even if the special difficulties attendant upon locating
and identifying unwed fathers at birth would justify a
legislative distinction between mothers and fathers of
newborns, these difficulties need not persist past
infancy. . . . In those cases where the father never has
come forward to participate in the rearing of his child,
nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the
State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing
the adoption of that child. fId. at 392, emp. added.]
-20-

Other members of the Court in Caban echoed the view that
the unwed mother and father of illegitimate newborns are not
similarly situated with respect to the child:
With respect to a large group of adoptions—those of
newborn children and infants--unwed mothers and unwed
fathers are simply not similarly situated . . . . Our
law has given the unwed mother the custody of her
illegitimate children precisely because it is she who
bears the child and because the vast majority of unwed
fathers have been unknown, unavailable, or simply
uninterested. This custodial preference has carried with
it a correlative power in the mother to place her child
for adoption or not to do so.
. . . These common and statutory rules of law reflect
the physical reality that only the mother carries and
gives birth to the child, as well as the undeniable
social reality that the unwed mother is always an
identifiable parent and the custodian of the child—until
or unless the State intervenes. The biological father,
unless he has established a familial tie with the child
by marrying the mother, is often a total stranger from
the State's point of view. I do not understand the Court
to question these pragmatic differences. See ante, 392,
60 L Ed 2d, at 307. An unwed father who has not come
forward and who has established no relationship with the
child is plainly not in a situation similar to the
mother1s. [Id. at 398-99, Stewart, J., dissenting,
citations omitted, emp. added.]

Justice Stevens, joined by two other members of the
Court, observed:
Men and women are different, and the difference is
relevant to the question whether the mother may be given
the exclusive right to consent to the adoption of a child
born out of wedlock. . . .
These differences continue at birth and immediately
thereafter. During that period, the mother and child are
together; the mother's identity is known with certainty.
The father, on the other hand, may or may not be present;
his identity may be unknown to the world and may even be
uncertain to the mother. These natural differences
between unmarried fathers and mothers make it probable
that the mother, and not the father or both parents, will
have custody of the newborn infant.
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B.

Controlling Decisions Upholding Statutory Distinction
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), rejected the

equal protection argument raised by plaintiff in this case on
facts very similar to the present case.

There, the putative

father of an illegitimate child lived with the mother before the
baby's birth and visited the mother and baby in the hospital at
the time of birth.

However, he did not place his name on the

baby's birth certificate; he did not live with the mother and
baby after the birth; he did not offer to marry the mother; and
he provided no financial support to the mother and baby.
252.

Id. at

Two years later the mother and her husband filed an

(footnote continued)
. . . [A]s a matter of equal protection analysis, it
is perfectly obvious that at the time and immediately
after a child is born out of wedlock, differences between
men and women justify some differential treatment of the
mother and father in the adoption process.
Most particularly, these differences justify a rule
that gives the mother of the newborn infant the exclusive
right to consent to its adoption. Such a rule gives the
mother, in whose sole charge the infant is often placed
anyway, the maximum flexibility in deciding how best to
care for the child. It also gives the loving father an
incentive to marry the mother, and has no adverse impact
on the disinterested father. Finally, it facilitates the
interests of the adoptive parents, the child, and the
public at large by streamlining the often traumatic
adoption process and allowing the prompt, complete, and
reliable integration of the child into a satisfactory new
home at as young an age as is feasible. . . .
With this much the Court does not disagree; it
confines its holding to cases such as the one at hand
involving the adoption of an older child against the
wishes of a natural father who previously has
participated in the rearing of the child and who admits
paternity. Ante, at 392-393, 60 L Ed 2d, at 307-308.
[Id. at 404-08, Stevens, J., dissenting, footnotes and
citations omitted, emp. added.]
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adoption petition without notice to the father, and one month
after that the father filed a paternity petition in a different
county.

The adoption order was entered pursuant to state law,

without notice to or consent of the father, even though the
judge was aware of the father's paternity petition then pending
in a different court.

The father thereafter challenged the

constitutionality of the state law which allowed adoption of
illegitimate children with the consent of the mother alone,
unless the father acquired a consent right by registering a
timely claim of paternity.

Ld. at 251-53.

The Lehr Court rejected the father's claim that the state
law violated equal protection by according greater rights to
unwed mothers than to unwed fathers.

The Court emphasized that

"the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the
responsibilities they have assumed."

Jd. at 257.

The Court

then adopted the view of the four dissenting Justices in Caban
"identify!ing] the clear distinction between a mere biological
relationship and an actual relationship of parental
responsibility."

Id. at 259-60.

The Court concluded that

because the father had never established a "substantial
relationship" with his illegitimate child, the statute did not
operate to deny equal protection:
Whereas [the mother] had a continuous custodial
responsibility for [the child], [the father] never
established any custodial, personal, or financial
relationship with her. If one parent has an established
custodial relationship with the child and the other
parent has either abandoned or never established a
relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not
prevent a State from according the two parents different
legal rights.
-23-

Id. at 267-68, emp. added.

See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434

U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (rejecting unwed father's equal protection
claim vis-a-vis married fathers because the unwed father had
"never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to
the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the
child").
This Court has previously upheld section 78-30-4 on
similar grounds under the state and federal equal protection
provisions.

In Ellis v. Social Services Department, 615 P.2d

1250 (Utah 1980), the unwed father, who had developed no
relationship with his illegitimate child, relied on Caban to
challenge the statute's unequal treatment of unwed mothers and
fathers.

The Court easily distinguished Caban on the basis that

the father there had developed a substantial relationship with
his children over a number of years.

The Court noted that Utah

law protects such fathers by recognizing their adoption of
children by acknowledgment pursuant to section 78-30-12, without
registration of paternity.

However, the Ellis Court concluded

that where the unwed father has developed no such relationship,
equal protection does not require that he be accorded an
adoption veto power equal to the mother's. 615 P.2d at 1255.
Plaintiff criticizes Ellis, asserting that it requires an
unwed father to register his paternity pursuant to 78-30-4 as a
condition of adoption by acknowledgment pursuant to 78-30-12.
(Brief of Pet. at 16-17.)

This argument misconstrues Ellis.

The Ellis Court correctly characterized 78-30-12 as a separate,
alternative means of perfecting paternal rights.

615 P.2d at

1255.

The Court did not state that registration of paternity is

necessary for adoption by acknowledgment; indeed, 78-30-12
expressly states that "[t]he foregoing provisions of this
chapter do not apply to such an adoption."

(Add. 46.)

Ellis

merely states the obvious, that if an unwed father fails timely
to register his paternity, he risks losing his rights before
adoption by acknowledgment is accomplished.

615 P.2d at 1254.

Moreover, In re T.R.F., 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1988),
emphatically does not "modify" Ellis, as claimed by plaintiff.
(Brief of Pet. at 17.)

T.R.F. expressly states that Ellis

cannot be read to "graft" the registration requirement onto the
acknowledgment statute, 760 P.2d at 910-11, and concludes that
the unwed father had accomplished adoption by acknowledgment
without timely registration of paternity, ]Ld. at 912.
In Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah
1984), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its equal protection
holding in Ellis:
Implicit in that decision was the holding that there are
reasonable bases for the classifications in the statute
(between unwed mothers and fathers and between fathers
who file and fathers who do not) and that these
classifications are reasonably calculated to serve a
proper government objective. [Id. at 204.]
However, the Wells Court went beyond Ellis in identifying the
putative father's rights, the state's interest in the adoption
process, and the justification for according unwed mothers and
fathers different rights.
The Wells Court recognized that "an unwed father's right
to his relationship with his newborn is a provisional right by
comparison with the vested right of a parent who has fulfilled a
-25-

parental role over a considerable period of time."
emp. add.

Id. at 206,

The Court explained that the father's right can be

forfeited pursuant to 78-30-4:
Although parental rights have their origin in
biological relationships, those relationships do not
guarantee the permanency of parental rights.
Constitutionally protected parental rights can be lost.
They can be surrendered pursuant to statute. [Ld. at 202.]
Regarding the state's interest in the adoption of
illegitimate newborns, the Court stated:
There are special problems in defining parental
rights over newborns who are illegitimate. The identity
of the father may be unknown. The mother may desire to
give the child up for adoption. The state has a strong
interest in speedily identifying those persons who will
assume the parental role over such children, not just to
assure immediate and continued physical care but also to
facilitate early and uninterrupted bonding of a child to
its parents. The state must therefore have legal means
to ascertain within a very short time of birth whether
the biological parents (or either of them) are going to
assert their constitutional rights and fulfill their
corresponding responsibilities, or whether adoptive
parents must be substituted. [Ld. at 203.]
The Court concluded that this "strong interest in immediate and
secure adoptions for eligible newborns provides a sufficient
justification for significant variations in the parental rights
of unwed fathers, who, in contrast to mothers, are not
automatically identified by virtue of their role in the process
of birth."

M.

See also Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services,

222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448 (1986) (rejecting equal protection
challenge to similar statute).
In summary, the profound differences between the
situations of the unwed mother and father with respect to their
newborn child justify and require "significant variations" in
their respective parental rights.
-26-

It is the mother who has the

exclusive right to decide whether to bear the child or not.
U.C.A. § 78-14-5(4)(f); cf.

See

§§ 76-7-302 to -305; see also

Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976)
(invalidating spousal consent requirement for abortion); Doe v.
Rampton. 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973) (invalidating Utah
spousal consent requirement); Comment, "Husband Notification for
Abortion in Utah:
609, 613-15.

A Patronizing Problem," 1986 Utah L. Rev.

Her constitutional right of privacy allows her to

withhold the fact of pregnancy, as well as the father's
identity, from other persons.

Lehr, supra, 463 U.S. at 264;

Caban, supra. 441 U.S. at 404-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Wells, supra. 681 P.2d at 207; B.J.R.L. v. State of Utah. 655 F.
Supp. 692, 697-99 (D. Utah 1987) (discussing privacy rights of
unwed mother and child in support context); In re Karen A.B..
513 A.2d 770, 772 (Del. 1986) (mother's privacy interest in
being free from harassment by unwed father); Barron, "Notice to
the Unwed Father and Termination of Parental Rights," 9 Fam.
L.Q. 527, 540-42 (1975); Poulin, "Illegitimacy and Family
Privacy:

A Note on Maternal Cooperation In Paternity Suits," 70

Nw. U.L. Rev. 910, 922-24 (1976).

The mother has the right to

marry another man before the child is born, making it the
legitimate child of her husband "for all purposes."

See U.C.A.

§ 30-1-17.2; In re J.S.V.. 402 Mass. 571, 524 N.E.2d 826 (1988)
(putative father of child born to married woman has no right to
notice of adoption).

It is the mother who bears and nourishes

the child throughout the pregnancy; it is she who is constantly
faced with decisions about how best to care for the child; it is
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she whose health is threatened and whose freedoms and activities
are restricted by the pregnancy and birth.

She is automatically

identified as the mother by her role in the birth process, and
consequently will have custody of and responsibility for the
newborn infant.

See In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d

1059, 1068-69 (Okla. 1985) (rejecting unwed father's equal
protection challenge to similar adoption statute); Wells, supra,
681 P.2d at 203; Caban, supra, at 405 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

In short, the unwed mother has a substantial

relationship with the child from the moment of birth.

See

Poulin, supra, at 916.
By contrast, the unwed father's relsttionship with his
child at birth is purely biological.

He may or may not be

present; his location and identity may be unknown, even to the
mother; and even if known, he may be unwilling to assume the
full responsibilities of parenthood.

Wells, supra, at 203;

Lehr, supra, at 260-61 ("Parental rights do not spring
full-blown from the biological connection between parent and
child.

They require relationships more enduring.").
Plaintiff concedes that 78-30-4 is valid with respect to

unwed fathers whose identity and location are unknown, but
argues that it is unconstitutional as applied to "identified,
present and willing fathers."

(Brief of Pet. at 10.) This

argument overlooks the major purpose of the registration
statute, which is to determine promptly and conclusively whether
the unwed father is committed to support his child and to assume
full legal responsibility for the lifetime care of the child.
-28-

This determination is just as important with respect to known
and present unwed fathers as it is for absent and unknown
fathers.

As illustrated by the facts in Lehr and Sanchez, a

father who is known and present but who has failed to
demonstrate his legal commitment is of no more benefit to the
child than a father whose identity and location are unknown.
The state cannot merely assume that a known and present unwed
father will undertake full parental responsibility for the
child.

In the absence of a legal tie between the father and

child, the state needs some way to ascertain promptly and
conclusively whether the father will assume full parental
responsibility.

The registration requirement achieves that

statutory objective by allowing unwed fathers to fill the gap of
legal commitment left open by the absence of marriage.
C.

Policy And Privacy Reasons For Statutory Distinction
Plaintiff's argument seems to suggest that 78-30-4 is

deficient in not requiring every known unwed father to be
contacted personally, before the adoptive placement, to
ascertain his interest in custody or to obtain his consent for
the adoption.

However, as discussed under due process, infra,

"[The Constitution] does not require that the father of an
illegitimate child be identified and personally notified before
his parental right can be terminated."

Wells, supra, 681 P.2d

at 207. A paternal consent requirement would also be contrary
to the public policies and privacy interests underlying the
statute.

As stated in Caban:

If the State were to require the consent of both parents,
or some kind of hearing to explain why either1s consent
-29-

is unnecessary or unobtainable, it would unquestionably
complicate and delay the adoption process. [441 U.S. at
407-08, Stevens, J., dissenting.]
Delay of the adoption undermines the entire statutory scheme by
lessening the chances of adoption and depriving the child of
early and uninterrupted bonding to its parents.

Lehr, supra,

463 U.S. at 264-65; Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's
Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1982); Wells, supra, at
203.

3

Requiring the unwed father's consent to the adoption
threatens the mother's right of privacy, as discussed above, by
inducing unwanted disclosure of the pregnancy and the parents'
identities and by restricting the mother's freedom of choice
with regard to the baby.

To avoid disclosure and conflict, many

mothers would simply withhold their child from adoption, against
their best judgment, thus foreclosing the child's opportunity
for a better life, as well as reducing the number of children

As one scholar has noted:
[T]hose concerned about the welfare of an illegitimate
infant cannot keep the child indefinitely in limbo,
waiting to see what "functional equivalents" of marriage
the father will demonstrate if he is given plenty of
time. It is not difficult to sense the risks to a child
in such circumstances, knowing as we do how much every
child needs a sense of continuity and stability in the
child-parent relationship. Quilloin's waiting child is a
vivid symbol of the way all persons wait in a
noncommittal relationship, whether child or adult, at
risk in a sea of uncertain expectations.
Hafen, "The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and
Sexual Privacy--Balancing the Individual and Social Interests,"
81 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 498-99 (1983).
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available to increasing numbers of infertile couples desiring to
adopt.

Other unwed mother's facing a father s veto of the

adoption will turn to other alternatives.

They may either

withhold the father's identity, falsely declare the father to be
"unknown," use another person to pose as a consenting father, or
resort to independent or black market adoptions in which the
legal requirements may be more easily circumvented.

See Note,

"The Putative Father's Due Process Rights to Notice and a
Hearing," 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1081, 1093-94 n.47; In re Adoption
of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 490 (1975)
(grant of adoption veto power to unwed fathers "will provide a
very fertile field for extortion").

More unwed mothers would

also turn to abortion, which has been identified as the number
one barrier to adoption.

America's Waiting Children, supra,

National Committee For Adoption, Adoption
Factbook—United States Data, Issues, Regulations and Resources
12, 18, 55-63 (Washington, D.C. 1985) (hereafter "Adoption
Factbook"); Office of Population Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Health
and Human Services, The Adoption Option: A Guidebook For
Pregnancy Counselors 13-15 (1987). Requiring notice to or
consent of unwed fathers has been identified as an unnecessary
barrier to adoption:
The father of the baby may delay or cause an adoption
plan to be cancelled, even when he does not intend to
raise the baby himself or has provided no financial or
emotional support before or after the baby's birth.
Interagency Task Force on Adoption, America's Waiting Children:
A Report to the President 9, 20, 33 (Washington, D . C , March
1988) (hereafter "America's Waiting Children"). See also In re
T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. 1980) (recognition of consent
right in unwed father "would give him a powerful club with which
he could substantially reduce the options available to the
unmarried mother").
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at 17 (nearly one-third of the one-and-a-half million abortions
in 1982 involved teenage mothers); Adoption Factbook, supra, at
18.

When adoption could provide a positive solution that meets

the needs of all parties, the result may instead be coerced
abortion to avoid the stresses and stigma of unwed motherhood
identified in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
In addition, the delay and uncertainty associated with a
paternal consent requirement would cause lasting psychological
and emotional injury to the child and adoptive parents.

Crucial

bonding with adoptive parents would be either totally lost, if
the child is in foster care, or weakened by the adoptive
parents' uncertainty regarding the permanence of the placement.
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, Beyond The Best Interests of The
Child 22 (The Free Press, 1979).

The child "feelfs] the

impermanency and insecurity of the arrangement which clashes
with his need for emotional constancy."

Ld. at 25.

Accordingly, "to avoid irreparable psychological injury,
placement, whenever in dispute, must be treated as the emergency
that it is for the child."

Ld. at 43.

Placements must also be

final and irrevocable if adoptive parents are to rely on the
adoption process.
D.

Wells, supra, at 206-07.

Plaintiff Was Not A "Willing" Father
Finally, plaintiff argues that the statute operated

unconstitutionally in this case by identifying him as
"unwilling," while identifying P. as "willing," to assume
parental responsibilities.

(Brief of Pet. at 8-12.) This

argument misconstrues the statute and the facts.
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The mother's

position with regard to the illegitimate infant is determined by
whether she relinquishes custody to an agency or other person
for adoption.

If she retains custody, her continuing commitment

to the child is manifest and no registration of that fact is
necessary.

By relinquishing the child for adoption, a mother

does not evidence "unwillingness" or "irresponsibility" (Brief
of Pet. at 8), but rather demonstrates a mature love and concern
for the child's best interests and lifetime care.
As for plaintiff, while he was present in the hospital at
the time of the child's birth, he failed to demonstrate his
claimed willingness to assume the responsibilities of
fatherhood.

For several months prior to the birth he denied the

baby was; he did not sign the birth certificate; he did not pay
the hospital expenses or subsequent support; he failed to timely
register his paternity; he never offered to marry P.; and he had
no intention of living with and supporting her and the baby.

To

the contrary, he continued dating and engaging in sexual
relations with other girls.

He merely assumed that P. would

keep the baby, allowing him to visit periodically at his
convenience.

Plaintiff's visits to the hospital were equally as

likely for the purpose of maintaining a relationship with P. as
for developing a relationship with the baby.

The subsequent

visit at his apartment was initiated by P., not by plaintiff.
And the baby shower was given by the family, not by plaintiff.
Even now, it is only his sister who wants the baby, not
plaintiff.

This is the only case of which defendants are aware

in which the putative father seeks to upset an adoption, not to
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establish his own relationship with the child, but to allow
someone else that opportunity.

In short, plaintiff does not

fall within the class of "identified" and "willing" fathers, as
claimed, and therefore lacks standing to assert discrimination
against that class.

See, e.g., County Court of Ulster County v.

Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55 (1979).
In conclusion, plaintiff's equal protection rights were
not violated by operation of section 78-30-4. As the Court of
Appeals concluded:
[Because plaintiff] failed to communicate concern for and
interest in the child apart from his few visits with her
..., it is not unjust for him to be classified with other
similarly situated unwed fathers who have lost their
parental rights by not coming forward to acknowledge
their parental responsibilities. [Slip Op., Add. 11.]
The statute accurately identified both plaintiff and P. as unwed
parents who, for whatever reasons, preferred to allow their baby
to be reared by someone else.

The statute's objective was met

in promptly placing the baby with loving, caring adoptive
parents.

There is no basis under equal protection to disturb
5
that adoptive placement.

Plaintiff asserts in Point II of his Brief that
78-30-4 violates the equal protection provision of the Utah
Constitution. (Brief of Pet. at 21-23.) However, plaintiff
presented no separate state equal protection argument in the
Court of Appeals, and that court rendered no ruling on the
issue. (Slip. Op., Add. 11, citing State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d
1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988).) Accordingly, plaintiff may not
raise the separate state constitutional argument for the first
time in this review by writ of certiorari. See, e.g., New
Mexico Livestock Bd. v. Dose, 94 N.M. 68, 607 P.2d 606, 608-09
(1980).
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POINT III: THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT U.C.A.
§ 78-30-4(3) ADEQUATELY PROTECTED PLAINTIFF'S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS.
Plaintiff concedes the facial validity of 78-30-4(3)
(Brief of Pet. at 24), but then asserts what amounts to a facial
attack on the procedural aspects of the statute.
Add. 12.)

(See Slip Op.,

Plaintiff argues that the statute violates due

process, not by denying notice of the relinquishment or
adoption, but by denying the unwed father a hearing in which to
prove that he has not abandoned his child.

This denial of a

hearing, plaintiff asserts, results in inadequate protection of
his "opportunity interest" in forming a relationship with the
child.

(Brief of Pet. at 27, 31-32, 34.)

These arguments have

been squarely rejected by both this Court and the United States
Supreme Court.
To begin with, plaintiff attaches undue emphasis to the
term "abandonment" in

78-30-4(3)(c).

The operative language is

the remainder of the same sentence providing that failure to
register paternity constitutes a "surrender" of any right to
notice and a hearing or of consent to the adoption.

In Ellis v.

Social Services Department, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), the unwed
father asserted the same argument as that raised in the

As in the Court of Appeals, plaintiff nominally relies
on both federal and state due process provisions, while offering
no distinct briefing or analysis for either provision.
Following the rule set out in State v. Lafferty, supra,
defendants focus their response on federal due process
considerations.
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present case, challenging "the constitutionality of the
presumption that a father has abandoned his illegitimate child
where he does not file a timely notice of paternity with the
Bureau."

_Id. at 1255.

The Court characterized the argument as

claiming denial of procedural due process and upheld the
procedural features of the statute.

Id.

The Court noted that

the statute may violate due process as applied only if the
father did not have notice of the time and place of the birth,
thus making it "impossible for the father to file the required
notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar, through no fault
of his own."

Jd. at 1256.

Since the mother in Ellis came to

Utah from out-of-state and gave birth to the child without the
father's knowledge, the Court remanded for a determination of
whether the father reasonably could have known when and where
his child was born and could thus have protected his rights
through a timely registration of paternity.

Id.

In two subsequent decisions this Court reaffirmed the
facial validity of 78-30-4(3) and applied the Ellis
"impossibility" standard to uphold the statute as applied.

In

Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), the
unwed mother traveled to a distant city within the state to
deliver the baby and relinquish it for adoption.

Throughout the

pregnancy the father had been "equivocal, never indicating
positively whether or not he desired to assert his paternal
rights."

Id. at 202. While the father knew of the possibility

of adoption, he did not mail his claim of paternity until the
day of the birth, and consequently it was not received by state
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officials until one day after the relinquishment.

The Court

held that the registration was too late and that the statutory
termination of the father's rights was valid under the state and
federal due process provisions.
In upholding the facial validity of the statute, the
Wells Court expressly held that an unwed father's right to a
relationship with his newborn child is merely "provisional," not
vested, and that it "can be surrendered pursuant to statute,"
without a showing of unfitness or abandonment.
206.

Ld. at 202,

The Court recognized the state's "compelling interest in

speedily identifying those persons who will assume a parental
role over newborn illegitimate children."

Id-

at

206. The

Court observed:
Speedy identification is important to immediate and
continued physical care and it is essential to early and
uninterrupted bonding between child and parents. If
infants are to be spared the injury and pain of being
torn from parents with whom they have begun the process
of bonding and if prospective parents are to rely on the
process in making themselves available for adoptions,
such determinations must also be final and irrevocable,
lid. at 206-07.]
The Court held that 78-30-4(3) "is narrowly tailored to achieve
the purposes identified above," id. at 207, concluding:
No infringement of the unwed father's rights not
essential to the statute's purposes has been identified.
Due process does not require that the father of an
illegitimate child be identified and personally notified
before his parental right can be terminated. [Id.]

For a discussion of the bonding process and the
serious detrimental impact that disruption of the process causes
the child and its adoptive family, see Goldstein, Beyond The
Best Interests of The Child pp. 32-37 (The Free Press, 1973).
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The Wells Court also upheld the statute as applied,
noting that the birth occurred in the same state as the father's
residence; the father knew of the time of birth and the
possibility of adoption; and he failed adecjuately to communicate
an intent to assert his parental rights.

Accordingly, it was

not "impossible" for the father to timely register his
paternity.

Id. at 207-08.

In Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753 (Utah
1984), this Court again upheld application of 78-30-4(3), on
facts much more favorable to the father than those in the
present case.

There, the couple lived together; the unwed

father knew of the pregnancy; he knew the time and place of
birth; he visited the mother and baby in the hospital; he
proposed marriage; and he also expressed his desire for the
mother and baby to live with him.

The mother discussed possible

adoption with the father, and he attempted to sign the birth
certificate and register his paternity, but was prohibited from
registering until after the baby had been relinquished.

The

Court concluded that since the father knew of the time and place
of birth "and was presumed to know the law," his late
registration was ineffective.

_Id. at 755.

The Court reasoned:

It is of no constitutional importance that Sanchez came
close to complying with the statute. Because of the
nature of subject matter dealt with by the statute, a
firm cutoff date is reasonable, if not essential.
. . . [T]he degree of the father's diligence and
sincerity in trying to establish his parental rights . .
. [is] foreign to the statutory provisions. [Id.]
Most recently, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717
P.2d 686 (Utah 1986), the Court held that application of the
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statute violated due process, but on facts clearly
distinguishable from those of the present case.

There, the

unwed parents lived together for over three years; the mother
moved to Utah from out-of-state to have the baby; the mother
told the father she and the baby would live with him; the couple
planned to marry; and the father was in Arizona locating a home
for the family when the baby was born prematurely.

Li. at 687.

On those facts the Court held that the father could not
reasonably have complied with the registration requirement and
that his late registration should be honored.

Id. at 691.

However, the Court reaffirmed that due process does not require
actual notice of a proposed adoption "where the father knows or
should know of the birth and can reasonably take the timely
action required to avoid the statutory bar."

Id.

p

The facts of the present case align much more closely
with Wells and Sanchez than with Ellis and Baby Boy Doe.
Plaintiff learned of the pregnancy in October of 1986 and had
from then until the relinquishment on June 8, 1987 to register
his claim of paternity.

Unlike the fathers in Ellis and Baby

Boy Doe, plaintiff was a Utah resident, was presumed to know
Utah law, and had full knowledge of the time and place of
birth.

Like the father in Wells, plaintiff was "equivocal"

The Court of Appeals decision in In re K.B.E., 740
P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1987), adds nothing to the law as set forth
in the foregoing decisions of this Court. That case holds
simply that where the mother does not intend to relinquish the
baby for adoption, but races to the court with a petition merely
to cut off the father's rights, the father's acknowledgment
filed within hours after the birth is valid.
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about asserting his paternal rights.

See 681 P.2d at 202.

Plaintiff had consented to a prior adoption; he knew of the
possibility of this adoption; yet he refused to sign the birth
certificate; he paid none of the hospital expenses; there were
no plans to marry or live together; there was no offer of
support; and he continued dating other girls as before.

As P.

testified, it was plaintiff's demonstrated lack of commitment to
her and the baby that caused her to relinquish the baby for
adoption.

(I Tr. 38.)

Like the father in Sanchez, plaintiff

saw the mother and baby after the birth and "assumed" P. would
keep the baby, see 680 P.2d at 755, but he developed no
relationship with the baby and demonstrated no interest in
asserting his paternal rights until after the baby was
relinquished.

And the most telling fact of all is that

plaintiff does not now desire to establish a personal
relationship with the child.

Thus, plaintiff's statutory

forfeiture of his paternal rights does not offend principles of
g
fairness inherent in due process.

Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that he saw the baby
"daily" prior to relinquishment and that his family also visited
the baby. (Brief of Pet. at 28.) Those assertions are
unsupported in the record. Between Saturday June 6 when P. left
the hospital and Tuesday June 9 when P. physically delivered the
baby to LDS Social Services, plaintiff saw the baby only once,
and that was after the relinquishment, at plaintiff's apartment,
while one of his other girlfriends was present. (See Statement
of Facts, supra, pp. 6-7.)
Even if a showing of abandonment were required, the facts
of this case would support a conclusion of prenatal
abandonment. See, e.g., Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So.2d 1312,
1316-17 (Miss. 1982); State v. Lutheran Social Services, 227
N.W.2d 643, 646-47 (Wis. 1975).
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That conclusion is consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's due process holding in Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248 (1983).

(The facts of Lehr were outlined above in

connection with its equal protection analysis.)

The father

there raised the same argument as plaintiff does here, that a
statute requiring timely registration of an unwed father's
paternity does not adequately protect the father's right to
demonstrate or develop a relationship with his child.

The Court

distinguished Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), relied
upon by plaintiff here, on the basis that it involved
termination of a fully "developed parent-child relationship,"
whereas the father in Lehr had no such relationship.
at 261.

463 U.S.

The Court explained:

When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward
to participate in the rearing of his child," his interest
in personal contact with his child acquires substantial
protection under the Due Process Clause. . . . But the
mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection. [Id.]
The "biological connection," noted the Court, offers the father
"an opportunity" to develop a relationship with the child, but
if he fails to "grasp" that opportunity, due process does not
require his input or consent regarding the child's adoption.
Id. at 262.

The Court concluded that the father's "opportunity

interest" was adequately protected by the state's marriage law
and putative father registration statute.

Id. at 263.

Such a

statutory scheme might be "procedurally inadequate" only if it
"were likely to omit many responsible fathers and if
qualification for notice were beyond the control of an
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interested putative father."

id. at 264. However, as with

78-30-4(3), "the right to receive notice [of an impending
adoption] was completely within [the father's] control. . . .
The possibility that he may have failed to [register his claim
of paternity] because of his ignorance of the law cannot be
sufficient reason for criticizing the law itself."
263-64.

Jtd. at

The Court added that "legitimate state interests in

facilitating the adoption of young children and having the
adoption proceeding completed expeditiously . . . justify a
trial judge's determination to require all interested parties to
adhere precisely to the procedural requirements of the
statute."

Id. at 265.

n

Based on the controlling decisions above, the Court of
Appeals correctly concluded that plaintiff did not have full
parental rights to abandon.

(Slip Op., Add. 12.)

What he

The Court accepted the Legislature's judgment that "a
more open-ended notice requirement would merely complicate the
adoption process, threaten the privacy interests of unwed
mothers, create the risk of unnecessary controversy, and impair
the desired finality of adoption decrees." Ld. at 264.
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Lehr on the grounds
that it involved a step-parent adoption and "deals with a wholly
different statute." (Brief of Pet. at 36-37.) However, the
Court attached no significance to the fact that a stepfather was
involved; the focus was still on the biological father's failure
to protect his paternal right. As for the statute involved,
U.C.A. § 78-30-4(3) is more favorable to unwed fathers than the
statute upheld in Lehr because the Utah law gives registered
fathers an absolute veto power over any adoption, whereas the
New York law allowed registered fathers merely to present
evidence "relevant to the best interests of the child." See
Lehr, supra, at 251 n.5.
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abandoned or forfeited was the opportunity to develop a
substantial parent-child relationship•

That "opportunity

interest" was adequately protected by the state's marriage law
and the registration statute.
P.2d at 755-56,

Lehr, supra; Sanchez, supra, 680

See also In re Adoption of S.J.B., 745 S.W.2d

606, 609 (Ark. 1988) (full parental rights do not attach to
unwed father of newborn); In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459,
462 (Ga. 1987) (opportunity interest of unwed father may be
abandoned if not timely pursued); B.G. v. H.S., 509 N.E.2d 214,
216-17 (Ind. App. 1987) (not unreasonable to require unwed
father to take timely action to protect his opportunity
interest); In re Petition of Steve B.D., 730 P.2d 942, 945
(Idaho 1986) (unwed father's opportunity for parent-child
relationship is "fleeting" and will be lost if not quickly
"grasped").
In summary, plaintiff's argument for an abandonment or
fitness hearing must be rejected for the reason that he did not
hold fully developed parental rights.

The cases cited by

plaintiff in support of a hearing are clearly inapplicable
because they all deal with termination of fully vested parental
rights.

(Brief of Pet. at 29-33.)

Plaintiff's biological

relationship "does not merit equivalent constitutional
protection."

Lehr, supra, at 261.

See also Quilloin v.

Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254-55 (1978) (holding that parental
rights of unwed father whose relationship with child was purely
biological could be terminated without fitness hearing); In re
Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1067-68 (Okla. 1985) (due
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process does not require that unwed father be accorded notice
and hearing).

Under 78-30-4(3) plaintiff could have guaranteed

a right to a hearing by timely registering his paternity.
Moreover, as the statute is construed by this Court, even a
father who registers late may file an action to show that it was
impossible for him to register timely, through no fault of his
own.

Ellis, supra, at 1256.

If impossibility is established,

the father is then entitled "to show that he was not afforded a
reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute."
Wells, supra, at 208.

Id.; see

Thus, the statute is not likely to omit

many responsible fathers.

See Lehr, supra.

In fact, plaintiff

has been afforded several hearings in this case.

All told,

seven different judges in three different courts have examined
the merits of this case and have concluded that plaintiff's due
process rights were adequately protected.

As the Court of

Appeals concluded, plaintiff "had every reasonable opportunity
to register" his claim of paternity before the infant was
relinquished for adoption.

(Slip Op., Add. 15.)

Therefore, his

due process claim must be denied.
POINT IV:

PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM RAISING THE ISSUE OF
ADOPTION BY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN
THIS COURT.

Plaintiff asserts in his final argument that he adopted
P.fs baby by acknowledgment pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-30-12 before
the infant was relinquished for adoption.
42.)

(Brief of Pet. at

However, that argument is raised for the first time in

this Court.

Plaintiff's Complaint makes no such claim (Add.

26-29), and the district court issued no ruling on the issue
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because it was not presented.

In the Court of Appeals,

plaintiff discussed 78-30-12 only in connection with his
criticism of the Ellis equal protection analysis.

(See Slip

Op., Add. 10.) At no time, before now, has plaintiff asserted
the separate argument that he adopted the child by
acknowledgment, precluding application of 78-30-4. Accordingly,
under long-standing rules of appellate review, this Court may
not address the issue.

E.g., Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086,

1088 (Utah 1985); New Mexico Livestock Board v. Dose, supra, 607
P.2d at 608-09.
Even if the issue had been timely raised, the evidence in
the record could not possibly support a claim of adoption by
acknowledgment.

Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, adoption by

acknowledgment requires much more than merely acknowledging
paternity and having "some minimal contact" with the child over
a period of three or four days.

(Brief of Pet. at 46.)

It

requires (1) public acknowledgment by the father; (2) receipt of
the child into the father's family; and (3) treatment of the
child as legitimate.
1979).

Slade v. Dennis, 594 P.2d 898, 900 (Utah

In Slade this Court found adoption by acknowledgment on

the grounds that the father was present at the birth, paid the
expenses of birth, placed his name on the birth certificate,
timely registered paternity pursuant to 78-30-4(3), had regular
custody of the child, and treated the child as his own for the
first two years of the child's life.

Id. at 899-900.

In In re

Adoption of T.R.F., 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1988), cited by
plaintiff, the unwed father was held to have adopted his child

by acknowledgment because his name was on the child's birth and
baptismal records; he provided substantial support for the
child; and he visited or lived with the child and the child's
mother, often taking personal custody of the child, for
significant periods during the child's first five years of
life.

Id. at 907-08.

Without again detailing the deficiencies

in plaintiff's parent-child relationship, suffice it to say he
does not come close to adoption by acknowledgment.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should either reverse
the Court of Appeals decision with respect to state action and
dismiss the appeal, or affirm the decision in all respects.
DATED this

of April, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
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GARFF, Judge:

u:an Court ot

Appellant Steven Swayne appeals an order denying him
custody of his illegitimate child and seeks attorney fees under
42 U.S.C. § 1988 on the ground that Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4
(1987) unconstitutionally deprived him of his parental rights.
We reverse in part and affirm in part.
Appellant and the mother, P., are the unwed parents of the
child whose custody is at issue. Appellant and P. began dating
and having sexual relations in late 1985.
While they were dating, P. supported appellant by allowing
him to use her car and by giving him money for his apartment
rent and other expenses. During this period of time, appellant
was also dating and having sexual relations with other women.
Prior to dating P., appellant had fathered another child out of
wedlock, who was born in February 1986. Appellant signed
papers consenting to that child's adoption on February 9, 1986.
Appellant became aware of the pregnancy in October 1986.
He initially became angry, denying that the baby was his.
However, in April 1987, he informed members of his family that
he was the father of the child. His family then held a baby
shower for P. Appellant also approached his sister about
raising the child until such time as he became "more stable."
During the pregnancy, appellant and P. resided in Salt Lake
County but did not live together. Prior to the baby's birth,
appellant indicated that he did not intend to marry anybody,
including P., because wit didn't appeal" to him. He suggested

to P. that if she decided to keep the baby, she could live with
his mother so long as she supported herself and paid half of
the rent. He never offered to live with her and the baby as a
family unit. However, after P. relinquished the baby,
appellant then offered to marry her -on paper" because it
-would make the baby legitimate.- He told P. that they did not
have to live together and that she would not need to tell her
parents, but that such an arrangement would make their legal
case better.
P. informed appellant in March 1987 that her parents wanted
her to relinquish the baby for adoption. Appellant responded
that adoption should be P.'s decision, and that if she did not
want the baby she could give it to him.
In March 1987, P. made an appointment with respondent,
L.D.S. Social Services,1 to discuss placing the baby for
adoption, but did not keep the appointment because she was
undecided as to what to do. Although she had considered
keeping the baby and living with appellant's mother, she was
uncertain that she would be able to meet the financial
requirements for that arrangement.
P. gave birth to a daughter on June 4, 1987. Appellant was
present in the delivery room during the birth and visited with
P. and the child during the two days they were in the hospital.
Appellant was not present in the hospital room when the
nurse filled out the birth certificate and informed P. that
appellant had to sign an acknowledgment of paternity form in
front of a notary public to have his name entered as the father
on the baby's birth certificate. When appellant later visited
P., she had the form in her hospital room and informed him that
he had to sign it. He did not sign it. Consequently, the
birth certificate does not indicate the identity of the father.
Later, appellant denied ever having seen the acknowledgment
form, but stated that he had told P. he wanted to put his name
on the birth certificate. He admitted, however, that he knew
1. L.D.S. Social Services was licensed during the relevant
time period by the State of Utah as a qualified child placement
agency pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 55-8a-l (1984) (repealed
1988), but receives no governmental funding and has no
governmental agency or entity involved in its internal
operation, affairs, or decisions except as expressly authorized
by the licensing statute.
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he was supposed to sign something in the hospital to get his
name on the birth certificate.
On Saturday June 6, 1987, P. was discharged from the
hospital. P.'s mother assumed financial responsibility and
took P. and the baby to her home. Appellant did not pay any cf
the hospital bills but did eventually pay $45 toward the
obstetrician's bill.
P.'s mother made an appointment with respondent for June 8,
1987, so that P. could discuss placing the baby for adoption.
On June 8, P. brought the baby to appellant's apartment for
a visit. She did not inform him that she was planning to place
the baby for adoption. The same day, P. and her parents took
the baby to respondent where a counselor explained the adoption
process to them. During this meeting, P. told the counselor
that appellant had no interest in marriage nor in living with
and supporting her and the baby.
The counselor told P. that the decision to place the baby
for adoption was hers alone to make and that if she was not
sure, she could place the baby in temporary foster care until
she decided. P. decided that it was in the baby's best
interest to place her for adoption. She then signed an
affidavit and release relinquishing custody of the baby to
respondent to place her for adoption, stating that she was
doing this of her own free will and choice, and that she
understood what she was doing.2
2. P. later testified that she was emotionally unstable at the
time because she was concerned over appellant's lack of
commitment to her and because of parental pressure in that her
parents had told her that she could have no contact with her
family if she kept the baby. She also stated that she did not
tell the counselor much about her relationship with appellant
because her parents, who did not like him, were in the room
with her. However, P., "[a]fter considering all the
circumstances, such as Steven's lack of interest in me and the
baby, my inability to support and rear the baby alone, the
problems of bringing a . . . baby into a possible marriage with
another man, and the need of the baby to have a good home,"
chose to relinquish the baby. Her articulated reasons for
relinquishing indicate that, despite the emotional turmoil she
was going through, she had thought out and deliberately made an
uncoerced decision.
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During the meeting, the counselor telephoned the Bureau of
Vital Statistics of the Utah Department of Health and inquired
whether an acknowledgment of paternity had been filed for the
child. She was informed that one had not been filed. Because
it was late in the day, the counselor permitted P. to take the
baby home that night and bring her back the following day.
On June 9, P. and the baby visited appellant at his
apartment. She did not inform him of the relinquishment, but
told him that she was going to California and was taking the
baby with her. She testified that she was afraid to tell him
about the relinquishment because of his recent interest in the
child, his potential retaliation against her family, and
because he was upset that she was going to California. At 5:00
that afternoon, P. gave custody of the baby to respondent and
left for California the following day, June 10. During this
trip, she called appellant each day and pretended that she had
the child with her.
Respondent transferred custody of the baby to the adoptive
parents on June 12, 1987. The child has resided with the
adoptive parents ever since.
On June 13, P. called appellant's family and, because she
was afraid to tell appellant the truth, told them that the baby
was dead. Appellant's mother called the hospital in California
to see if it had any record of the baby and discovered the
deception. When appellant called P. back, she admitted her
deception, informed appellant of the adoption, and agreed to
return to Salt Lake City to help him attempt to gain custody of
the child.
On June 15, appellant filed an acknowledgment of paternity
with the Registrar of Vital Statistics. He and P. filed an
affidavit to amend the child's birth certificate to add his
name as the father and to give the child his last name. They
then went to respondent to ask for the child, but were advised
by the counselor that it was too late, the child had already
been placed with adoptive parents, and that they would have to
contact their lawyers.
On June 29, appellant brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
in Federal District Court, requesting custody of the child.
Judge J. Thomas Greene found that the federal court had
jurisdiction over the case because state action was present and
tbe persons involved in the adoption were state actors.
However, at respondent's request, Judge Greene elected to
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abstain to allow the state courts to interpret section 78-30-4,
dismissing the case on September 3, 1987.
Appellant then filed this state court action on September
7, 1987. On September 24, 1987, he filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction prohibiting respondent from continuing
to deny him custody of the child during the pendency of the
state action.
On December 31, 1987, after an evidentiary hearing, the
trial judge denied appellant's motion, specifically finding
that: (1) Hit was not impossible for [appellant] to have filed
his notice of claim of paternity prior to the date the child
was relinquished for adoption-; (2) appellant, throughout P.'s
pregnancy, -did not behave in a manner consistent with that of
a concerned, committed father, nor did he clearly articulate an
intent or desire to assume the responsibilities of parenthood
or to keep and rear the child-; and (3) appellant, if awarded
custody of the child, would relinquish her to his sister to
care for, rather than caring for her himself.
On February 24, 1988, respondent moved for summary judgment,
A hearing on this motion was held on March 4, 1988. The
court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment,
dismissed appellant's action, and awarded costs to respondent,
finding that: (1) there was no genuine issue as to any
material fact; (2) respondent's acts did not constitute state
action; and (3) section 78-30-4 was valid on its face and as
applied under the due process and equal protection provisions
of the Utah and United States Constitutions.
On March 15, 1987, appellant filed a notice of appeal
before this Court. His appeal raises the following issues:
(1) Did respondent's conduct constitute sufficient -state
action" to invoke constitutional protections? (2) If so, does
section 78-30-4 (1987), as applied to the facts in this case,
violate the equal protection provisions of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 24 of the Utah Constitution, or the due process
provisions of the first and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution? (3) Does section 78-30-4 violate the provisions
of article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution?
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STATE ACTION
The fourteenth amendment guarantees of equal protection and
due process apply "only if the deprivation of life, liberty, or
property is by governmental 'state action' rather than by
purely private action.- Swavne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 670
F.Supp. 1537, 1540 (D.Utah 1987). This case involves the
termination of appellant's parental rights, a liberty interest
which has repeatedly been recognized as worthy of
constitutional protection by the United States Supreme Court.
Stanley v. Illinois. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
The United States Supreme Court, in Luoar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), delineated a two-prong test for
determining whether state action was involved in a
deprivation: (1) the deprivation must be caused by the
exercise of a state-created right or privilege, and (2) the
party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor. J&. at 941; accord Dirks
v. Cornwell, 754 P.2d 946, 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Respondent argues that its conduct in placing the baby for
adoption did not constitute state action because the adoptive
placement of children is not the exclusive prerogative of the
state, so is not a state-created right or privilege. Further,
because respondent receives no state funding and has no
governmental control over its internal affairs, it is not a
state actor. However, this argument sidesteps the real issue,
whether respondent may be considered to be a state actor in
terminating appellant's parental rights through the operation
of section 78-30-4, rather than in placing appellant's child
for adoption.
Prior Utah cases interpreting section 78-30-4, although not
explicitly addressing this state action issue, assume the
existence of state action in the operation of this statute.
For example, the Utah Supreme Court, in Wells v. Children's Aid
Society of Utah. 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984) (quoting In re
Bover, 636 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Utah 1981)), stated that "[w]hen
state action impinges on fundamental rights, due process
requires standards which clearly define the scope of
permissible conduct so as to avoid unwarranted intrusion on
those rights."
We, therefore, concur with the finding of the United States
District Court in Swavne, that state action indeed existed in
the present circumstances, because (1) - [undoubtedly, the
State was responsible for the statute"; Swavne. 670 F.Supp. at
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1541 (quoting Luoar, 457 U.S. at 938); and (2) the statute
involved is self-operative and mandates the termination of
appellant's parental rights. Id* As Judge Greene explained:
The State of Utah, not a private party,
has made an official policy decision that
any time custody of an illegitimate child
is- relinquished by the mother, the
father's parental rights will be
automatically cut off unless a notice of
paternity previously has been filed by the
biological father. That state decision to
terminate the father's parental rights is
implemented through the actor or actors
who accept the child for placement,
whether a state entity, a private licensed
adoption agency, or any other person, for
example an attorney. It would be a total
fiction to allow the state to remove
itself from its decision to cut off
parental rights simply because a private
party triggers operation of the statute.
The only fair conclusion is that such a
private party becomes a "state actor" when
his or her actions bring the statute into
play so as to effectuate the
pre-determined state decision to terminate
parental rights.
Id. at 1541-42 (emphasis in original). Judge Greene also noted
that even though a private party may deprive a parent of the
physical custody of his child, only the state may irrevocably
sever all parental rights. Thus, state action is present in
the operation of section 78-30-4. Id. at 1542.
In view of this determination, we reverse the lower
court's finding that state action did not exist. Because we
have determined state action does exist in the operation of
section 78-30-4, the question becomes whether this state action
has deprived appellant of his constitutional rights.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Appellant first argues that section 78-30-4, as applied to
these facts, violates his constitutional right to equal
protection under the United States Constitution. He asserts
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that the similarly situated parents of an illegitimate child
are given different legal rights solely on the basis of their
sex since the mother's consent is required prior to any
adoption of the child regardless of whether she is willing to
fulfill her parental responsibilities while the father has the
right to consent to the child's adoption only if he files an
acknowledgment of paternity indicating his willingness and
intent to support the child pursuant to section 78-30-4.
-The essence of equal protection is that legislative
classifications resulting in differing treatment for different
persons must be based on actual differences that are reasonably
related to the legitimate purposes of the legislation."

Eipyntjun Fuel Svpplv Co, vt Salt LeKe City Corp./ 752 p.2d 884,
887 (Utah 1988)• Although appellant recognizes the legitimacy
of the purposes of section 78-30-4, which are to speedily
identify those persons who will assume the parental role over
illegitimate children and to facilitate immediate and
continuing physical care of and emotional bonding opportunities
for such children, Wells, 681 P.2d at 204, he alleges that the
classifications of section 78-30-4 are based on differences
that are not reasonably related to these purposes. He first
states that the statute defeats its objective by failing to
require the mother of an illegitimate child to take action to
identify herself as a willing parent as fathers are required to
do since an unfit and indifferent mother can prevent the
adoption of her child and, thus, fail to provide appropriate
physical care and emotional bonding opportunities for the
child. He then states that the statutory objective is also
defeated because it results in gender-based discrimination
against "identified, present, and willing fathers" who would,
in fact, provide the necessary care and bonding opportunities
for the child, and that an indifferent mother can arbitrarily
deprive such a father of his parental rights under the
statute.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Ellis v. Social Services
Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-dav Saints.
615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), has held that section 78-30-4 does
not, on its face, violate the equal protection rights of an
unwed father because the father's parental rights are the same
as the mother's and the same as if the child had been born
legitimate, providing he timely files his acknowledgment of
paternity pursuant to the statute. Where the father fails to
come forward by timely filing an acknowledgment of paternity or
by developing a substantial relationship with the child, the
equal protection clause does not preclude the state from
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terminating his parental rights.
380, 394 (1979).

Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.

In Wells, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed Elli's, finding
that there are reasonable bases for statutory differentiation
between unwed mothers and fathers and between fathers who file
an acknowledgment of paternity and those who do not. Wells,
681 P.2d at 204. The court also found that these
classifications are reasonably calculated to serve the proper
governmental objectives of (1) promptly identifying those
fathers who will acknowledge parental responsibilities, and (2)
speedily making children available for adoption. !£. The
Wells court, although recognizing that many unwed fathers are
unidentified and uninterested, stated that:
fathers who have Hfulfilled a parental
role over a considerable period of time
are entitled to a high degree of
protection,- whereas unwed fathers -whose
relationships to their children are merely
biological or very attenuated" are
entitled to a lesser degree of protection.
. . . .
-When an unwed father
demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by
•com[ing] forward to participate in the
rearing of his child,1 his interest in
personal contact with his child acquires
substantial protection under the due
process clause. . . . But the mere
existence of a biological link does not
merit equivalent constitutional

protection.*
Id. at 203 (quoting In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1375 (Utah 1982)
and Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983)) (emphasis
in original).
On the other hand, unlike unwed fathers, unwed mothers are
"automatically identified by virtue of their role in the
process of birth." Wells, 681 P.2d at 203. However, if shown
to be an unfit or indifferent parent on account of cruelty,
neglect, or desertion of the child, a mother may have her
parental rights judicially terminated and the child put up for
adoption without her consent pursuant to section 78-30-4(1).
Her parental rights will be terminated if she is shown to be
unwilling to fulfill her parental responsibilities.
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Thus, appellant's argument that the statutory
classifications are based on gender differences that are not
reasonably related to the statutory purposes fails.
Appellant next argues that we should not follow the Utah
Supreme Court's reasoning in Ellis because, as he asserts, that
opinion was based upon inherently contradictory statutory
provisions found in sections 78-30-4 and 78-30-12. He argues
that the protection afforded unwed fathers under section
78-30-12 is illusory because a father who has publicly
acknowledged his child may lose his parental rights anyway by
failing to file under section 78-30-4.
In In the Matter of the Adoption of T.R.F. v. Felan. slip
op. 870307-CA (Utah Ct. App. August 31, 1988), this Court
recently rejected this argument, holding that these two
statutes are not inconsistent but operate independently in the
appropriate factual contexts:
We interpret the statutes [sections
77-30-4 and 77-30-12] as follows: when
the unwed father acknowledges his child,
within the meaning of the acknowledgment
statute [section 77-30-12], prior to the
mother's relinquishment of the child or
prior to the filing of the petition for
adoption, then the father need not comply
with the requirements of the paternity
statute [section 77-30-4]. However, if
the claimed acts of acknowledgment occur
after the mother!s relinquishment or after
the petition for adoption has been filed,
then the paternity statute [section
77-30-4] governs.
Id. at p. 18. Thus, contrary to appellant's argument, the
protections offered the unwed father under section 78-30-12 are
not illusory because section 78-30-4 does not apply to him if
he has fulfilled the adoption by acknowledgment requirements.
He is protected under both sections.
If an unwed father establishes a substantial relationship
over a number of years with his children, his rights cannot be
extinguished without his consent under section 78-30-12.
Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1255. Similarly, a caring, involved unwed
father may file pursuant to section 78-30-4 even before such a
substantial relationship has developed to acquire the same
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rights. The unwed mother cannot/ then, arbitrarily divest him
of parental rights and the unwed father has the same rights to
consent to the adoption of his child as the mother.
Although appellant argues that section 78-30-4 violates his
constitutional right to equal protection as applied, he raises
no discernable argument on facts unique to this case: He
failed to file an acknowledgement of paternity prior to the
relinquishment of the child, and failed to communicate concern
for and interest in the child apart from his few visits with
her. He did not come forth after the birth of the child to
assert his claim to paternity nor did he agree to support the
child. He denied paternity for the major part of the pregnancy
and, even after admitting paternity, never indicated to the
mother or to anyone else any desire to marry her, to live
together with her and the child, or even to personally raise
the child. As such, it is not unjust for him to be classified
with other similarly situated unwed fathers who have lost their
parental rights by not coming forward to acknowledge their
parental responsibilities.
Appellant's fourth argument is that section 78-30-4
violates the equal protection provisions of the Utah
Constitution. "As a general rule, we will not engage in state
constitutional analysis unless an argument for different
analyses under the state and federal constitutions is
briefed.- State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah
1988). Because appellant has not set forth a separate state
constitutional analysis in his brief, we do not respond to this
argument. Merely stating that the statute violates the Utah
Constitution without arguing the specific conflicts is not
sufficient. We find that appellant's equal protection argument
fails.
DUE PROCESS
Appellant asserts that section 78-30-4 violates the due
process clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions.
He argues that the statute operates to terminate an unwed
father's parental rights before any adjudication of abandonment
occurs, thus making failure to file an acknowledgment of
paternity an irrebuttable presumption that he has abandoned his
child. Relying on Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657
(1971), which states that procedures cannot stand which
"explicitly [disdain] present realities in deference to past
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formalities,"3 he asserts that the statute violates due
process because the fact presumed, abandonment, does not follow
from his actual behavior in that he visited the child daily for
the four days following the child's birth, invited his family
to visit her, publicly acknowledged his paternity, and never
clearly expressed an intention to relinquish his parental
rights.
This argument is, essentially, an attack on the
constitutionality of the statute. The Utah Supreme Court has
already settled this issue in We11s. Applying an even more
stringent standard of review than required under the United
States Constitution because of the fundamental nature of
parental rights, the Wells court determined that section
78-30-4 is facially valid under the due process clause of the
Utah Constitution because (1) the state has a compelling
interest in speedily identifying those persons who will assume
a parental role over newborn illegitimate children, and (2) the
statute is narrowly tailored to achieve these purposes because
there is no infringement of the unwed father's rights not
essential to the statute's purposes. Wells, 681 P.2d at
206-07.
Further, appellant misconstrues the import of the statute.
Because of his unwed status, he does not have parental rights
subject to termination until he asserts them by either filing
an acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to section 78-30-4 or
by establishing a substantial relationship with the child
pursuant to section 78-30-12. If he does either of the above,
he preserves his parental rights. If he fails to come forward,
he has no parental rights to abandon. The statute cannot
create an irrebuttable presumption of abandonment where
parental rights do not exist.
3. Stanley is inapposite to this case because of
distinguishable facts: Peter Stanley was deprived of his
children with whom he had lived and had raised for eighteen
years. Upon the death of the children's mother, they were
placed with court-appointed guardians pursuant to an Illinois
statute which required that children of unwed fathers become
wards of the state upon the death of their mothers. Stanley,
405 U.S. at 646. The Court found this statute to be
unconstitutional because it created an irrebuttable presumption
that unwed fathers were unfit parents. In the present case,
appellant has not developed a comparable substantial
relationship with his child.
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the nature-of this
subject matter makes a firm cutoff date reasonable, if not
essential, because of the disruption to the children involved
by the protracted litigation that a contrary holding would
produce. Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753,
755-56 (Utah 1984). Further, marriage is the institution
established by society for the procreation and rearing of
children, and because of the disproportionate number of social
problems involving illegitimate children, it is not
too harsh to require that those
responsible for bringing children into the
world outside the established institution
of marriage should be required either to
comply with those statutes that accord
them the opportunity to assert their
parental rights or to yield to the method
established by society to raise children
in a manner best suited to promote their
welfare.
Id. at 756; see also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263.
Appellant also argues that section 78-30-4, as applied,
violates his due process rights. The Utah Supreme Court has
recognized that situations may arise in which it is impossible,
through no fault of his own, for an unwed father to file the
required notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar. In re
Adoption of Babv Bov Doe. 717 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah 1986);
Ellis. 615 P.2d at 1256. In such a situation, due process
requires that the unwed father be permitted to show that he was
not afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the
statute. If the father successfully shows that termination of
his parental rights is contrary to basic notions of due process
and if he comes forward within a reasonable time after the
baby's birth, he is deemed to have complied with the statute.
Ellis. 615 P.2d at 1256.
Such situations existed in Ellis and in Babv Bov Doe. In
Ellis, the child's mother and father resided in California.
The mother left California just prior to the child's birth
without advising the father as to where the birth was to
occur. When the child was born, she declared the father to be
unknown, and relinquished the child four days later. The court
found that the father was entitled to an opportunity to show,
as a factual matter, that he could not reasonably have expected
his baby to be born in Utah. I£. at 1256.

Likewise, in Babv Bov Doe, the father was not a Utah
resident and had spent less than a week in the state. Prior to
the baby's birth, the mother had told the father that she would
move to Arizona with him, thus alleviating any concern he might
have had about a potential adoption. The father then travelled
to Arizona, found employment and a place to live, and .moved the
couple's belongings from California to Arizona. Because all
parties were aware of the father's intent and desire to raise
the child, the mother's family deliberately withheld
information about the child's birth to avoid his obstruction of
the adoption. The baby was born early while the father was
travelling from California to Arizona. Consequently, the
father was unaware of the birth for three days, and only became
aware of it one day after the petition for adoption had been
filed. This father successfully showed that the termination of
his parental rights was contrary to the basic notions of due
process and that he came forward within a reasonable time after
the baby's birth. Thus, the court deemed him to have complied
with the statute. Babv Bov Doe, 717 P.2d at 690-91.
This "impossibility" exception is inapplicable, however,
in cases which do not involve situations where it is impossible
for the father to file the required notice through no fault of
his own. Wells. 681 P.2d at 207.
The Wells court found that no impossibility existed under
the following facts: The birth occurred in the same state as
the father's residence. Neither the child's mother nor the
adoption agency were involved in an effort to prevent the
father from learning of the birth or from asserting his
parental rights. Neither knew at the time of the
relinquishment that the father was seeking to assert his
parental rights. The father had advance notice of the expected
time of the birth and the fact that the mother intended to
relinquish the child for adoption. Further, the father had
advice of counsel on filing the required form, and had a copy
of the form provided by a social worker. ifiU at 207-08.
Likewise, in Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, the court
determined that section 78-30-4 was not unconstitutionally
applied: Both parents were Utah residents. Prior to the
birth, the mother had told the father she would not live with
nor marry him and that she was considering adoption. Together,
the couple attended a counseling session at the agency which
later took custody of the child for adoption. The father
visited the mother and child in the hospital prior to the time
the child was relinquished. On the day the child was
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relinquished, the mother called the father and told him to come
to the hospital if he wanted to see the baby one last time,
when the father went to the hospital, he did not protest the
mother's decision to place the child for adoption, but did
attempt to sign the birth certificate. He then filed a notice
of paternity after the baby was relinquished for adoption.
Babv Bov Doe, 717 P.2d at 690; Sanchez. 680 P.2d at 75.
In the present situation, both appellant and P. were
residents of Salt Lake County at the time the child was born.
Appellant was aware of the time and location of the child's
birth. As in Sanchez, no one had attempted to withhold from
appellant any information regarding the child's birth.
Appellant had made it clear to P. prior to the child's birth
that he was not going to marry her, live with her, or assume
any financial responsibility for her or for the baby. As in
Sanchez, appellant was present at the birth and visited P. and
the child in the hospital. Appellant knew of the possibility
of the child's adoption from March 1987 when P. told him that
her parents wanted her to relinquish the child. He told her
that adoption should be her decision. At the hospital,
appellant was instructed by P. that he had to sign an
acknowledgment of paternity to appear as the father on the
child's birth certificate, but did not sign it. P. signed the
relinquishment on June 8th, four days after the child was born,
and surrendered custody on June 9th. Although reprehensible,
P.'s attempt to mislead appellant about the relinquishment by
telling him that she had taken the child to California and that
the child had died was irrelevant because it came after the
fact.
Appellant had every reasonable opportunity to register
prior to the act of relinquishment. He also had actual
knowledge of the requirement to register, not only from P.'s
informing him of this necessity at the hospital, but also
because he, himself, had relinquished his rights to a previous
child a year earlier.
These facts more closely resemble those in Wells and
Sanchez, in which the impossibility exception was inapplicable,
than those in Ellis and Babv Bov Doe. We concur with the trial
court and find that appellant had an opportunity to file his
acknowledgment of paternity, and that it was not impossible for
him to do so prior to the relinquishment through no fault of
his own. As the Sanchez court stated, w[i]t is of no
constitutional importance that the father came close to
complying with the statute." Sanchez, 680 P.2d at 755. We,
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therefore, hold that section 78-30-4 was not unconstitutionally
applied to appellant.
OPEN COURTS
Finally, appellant raises the issue of whether section
78-30-4 violates the open court provisions in article I section
11 of the Utah Constitution. Appellant did not raise this
issue below, but first raised it on appeal to this court. As a
general rule, we do not consider issues raised for the first
time on appeal, so decline to address this issue. Rekward v.
Indus. Comm'n, 755 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); James v.
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
We affirm in part and reverse in part. We reverse the
trial court's ruling concerning state action, but affirm the
order denying appellant custody of the child. Because
appellant is not the prevailing party, we do not address the
issue of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Each party is
to beajf^iTts^wn costs on appeal.

WE CONCUR:

/ ^ ^ ^ fQ* U^f^y^
Russell W. Bench, Judge

Normal H. J a c k s o n , ^fcJge
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STATE OF UTAH

AAt£rt>£Z>

STEVEN H. SWAYNE,

FINDINGS OF FACT#
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER DENYING
P R E L I M I N A R Y INJUNCTION

P i a ) n 111' / ,

vs.
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,

C'ivi i No

I -87 » 0 5 9 6 Y

Judge Homer Wilkinson
Defendants.
T h i e m a t t e r came

p l a i n t i f f ' s M o t i o n ici

P r e l i m i n a r y I n j u n c t i o n a n d w a s h e a r d b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b l e Judge
H o m e r W i l k i n s o n at a special h e a r i n g o n N o v e m b e r 3 3 1 9 8 7 .
P l a i n t i f f w a s reprepenleil hy h\\ 1 ,y L

W a l k e r and M

David

Eckersley, and defendants were represented b y David M. McConkie
and M e r r i l l F. N e l s o n

following the hearing,

the mat tc i unde , ad isement . B a s e d o n t h e t e s t i m o n y a n d
e x h i b i t s p r e s e n t e d a t t h e h e a r i n g and t h e m e m o r a n d a

submitted

t h e p a r t i e s , t h e C o u r t h e r e b y e n t e r s Urn follow In yi I indings c f
lusions o f L a w a n d O r d e r .

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Penny Paxman is the natural mother of a child born

out of wedlock in Salt Lake City, Utah on June 4, 1987.
Plaintiff is the unwed father of the baby*
2.

Both plaintiff and the mother resided in Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, throughout the pregnancy and during all
times relevant to this matter.
3.

Plaintiff first learned of the pregnancy in October

of 1986.
4.

Plaintiff and the mother have never been married and

did not live with each other during the pregnancy.

Prior to the

relinquishment of the baby to LDS Social Services, plaintiff
never offered to marry the mother, to live with the mother, or
to financially support the mother or the baby.
5.

Plaintiff and the mother discussed during the

pregnancy that the mother's parents wanted her to relinquish the
baby for adoption.
6.

Plaintiff was present in the hospital at the time of

the birth and visited the mother and baby in the hospital
following the birth.
7.

Plaintiff was informed of the need to sign an

acknowledgment of paternity form in the hospital in order to
have his name entered on the baby's birth certificate as its
father.

The form was provided and made available to plaintiff

in the hospital but he did not sign it.
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The baby's birth
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certificate shows

father and the baby was given the mothei&

surname.
6

Prior to the relinquishment, plaintiff had assumed

none of the financial responsibility for the hospital expenses
01

t'huf b a b y 1 P B L

9

• i i.

Or June 8, 1987 the mother signed an Affidavit and

Release relinquishing care and custody r; f Iheft":• 1 •,» f. defends
LDS Social Set Ires to place the baby for adoption.

IDS Social

Services subsequently placed the baby with adoptive parents,
with whom the baby has since resided.
If,

The mother did not notify plaintiff before

relinquishing the baby for adoption.
II I

Oi ii Ji i II: i ,c ] 3

I! 9IE ; I 1 ic •

*

• -

plaintiff that

she had relinquished the baby for adoption.
the plaintiff registered his
aclr

edgmen

;J i t he Bureau of vital Statistics

and applied for an amendment to the birth certificate to
designate himself as father of the child.
impossible for plaintiff to have filed
his notice of claim of paternity prior to the date the child was
relinquished for adoption.
14

Throughout the pregnancy, plaintiff did not behave

in a manner consistent with that of a concerned, committed
father, nor did he clearly art. leu I • I,"1 a

In lei it vi desire to

assume the responsibilities of parenthood ox to keep and rear
the child.
_3_

15.

Plaintiff testified that if he were awarded custody

of the child he would relinquish it to his sister to care for.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In view of controlling case law, it is unlikely that

plaintiff will prevail on his claims that Utah Code Annotated
§78-30-4(3) violates the equal protection and due process
clauses of the state and federal constitutions, either on its
face or as applied.
2.

It does not appear from the evidence that plaintiff

would suffer irreparable injury by leaving the baby in adoptive
custody pending resolution of the merits of the lawsuit.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, and the Court having fully considered the evidence and
arguments presented, it is hereby ordered that plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction be denied.
DATED this a * day of December, 1987.
BY THE COURT

M

H

'U

*-•'*

U>

ft fc

-At'iUJ/

Homer Wilkinson
District Judge

i
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David M. McConkie, No, 2154
Merrill F. Nelaon, No. 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendant8
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

If- THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN H. SWAYNE,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE,

!
:
j
:

Defendants.

JUDGMENT

Civi] Mo

0-8^-05969

Judge Homer Wilkinaon

Defendanta' Motion for Summer> linlgrTienl cin^

m for

I' tfiiii i > ng before the Honorable Homer Wilkinaon on March 4„ 1988
Plaintiff vaa represented by M. David Eckeraley;
were repreaented by Davi il M

Defendants

If :: €• ii):i lki e ai ::1 M e i: i :1 1 1 f

Ne 1 aon.

The Con in t, having reviewed and considered the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits, memoranda and exhibita aubmitted fa} f1e
parties, as well

rom the prior

hearing on p l a i n t i f f a motion for preliminary injunction, hereby
enters final judgment as follows:
]

IT>f»' record i™ c i if • M" 11! i; ,i genuine issue as to any

material fact.
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2.

The challenged acts of defendants do not constitute

state action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 or under the due process and
equal protection provisions of either the United States
Constitution or the Utah Constitution.
3.

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 is valid, on its face and as

applied to the facts of this case, under both the due process
and equal protection provisions of both the United States and
Utah Constitutions.
4.

Defendants* motion for summary judgment is hereby

granted, and plaintiff9s action is dismissed.
5.

Defendants are awarded their costs pursuant to

U.R.Civ.P. 54(d).
DATED this / I day of March, 1988.

Hon. Homer Wilkinson
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

Approved as to Form:

2*

QerruU ••**

M. Divid Eckereley/?
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FILED
APR 131983
r w 'T| ifi: IT rj ,u rvv.Tp j Q F APPEALS
- -—00O00- — -

ClerX of the Coon
Oua Court of APDMIS

ORDER DENYING
SUMMARY REVERSAL
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

Steven H. Swayne,
Plaint it I and Appellant,

Court of Appeals No. 880177-CA

v.
L.D.S. Social Services, John Doe
and Jane Doe,
Defendants and Respondent

Appellant's motion for summary reversal of (lie trial court s,
judqmeni

i«, hf?Mjhy ilen i »'il.
Appellant's motion for injunction pending appeal is hereby

scheduled for hearing on Monday, April 18, 1988 at the hour of 1:30
p.m.
Dated this

/?

day of April, 1988.

BY THE COURT

'NORMAN H.^^ACKSON, Judge

APR 14198ft
OO

J- I L fc D
\J

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

*£&**2c**i

—-OO0OO

Steven H. Swayne,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
ORDER
v.
Case No. 880177-CA
L.D.S. Social Services, et al..
Defendants and Respondents.
Before Judges Jackson, Orme and Greenwood (On Law and Motion).
Appellant's notion for injunction pending appeal is hereby
denied.
The Court further determines that the best interests of the
minor child and of the parties require that this appeal be
scheduled for expedited briefing and hearing.

Therefore,

pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 2, the Court orders as follows:
1. Appellant's brief shall be filed with this Court and
served on or before May 10, 1988;
2. Respondent's brief shall be filed with this Court and
served on or before June 9, 1988;
3. Appellant's reply brief shall be filed with this Court
on or before June 16, 1988;
4. All designated portions of the record on appeal shall
be filed with this Court on or before June 10, 1988; and
5. Hearing on oral argument shall be held on Tuesday, June
21, 1988, at 2:00 p.m., before a regularly scheduled panel
of this Court.
DATED this 20th day of April, 1988.
FOR THE COURT:

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OOOOO

Regular February Term, 1989

Steven H. Swayne,
Petitioner and
Cross-Respondent,
v.
L.D.S. Social Services,
John Doe and Jane Doe,
Respondents and
Cross-Petitioners.

February 16, 1989

No. 880384

Petition foi Wi it nf Certiorari having been considered/ and
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, i< is ordered
that a petition for writ of Certiorari and a cross-petition for Writ
of Certiorari be, and the same in, granted an prayed.
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Billy L. Walker,Jr. (3358)
120 North 200 West
4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 538-3902
M. David Eckersley (0956)
HOUPT, ECKERSLEY & DOWNES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-0453

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN H. SWAYNE,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT

vs.
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,

Civil No:

C'B^CSUj

Defendants.
Plaintiff Steven H. Swayne alleges as follows for his
cause of action against the defendants.
1.

Plaintiff Steven Swayne is the natural father of

the child Meche' Cymone Paxman, which child was born on June 4,
1987.
2.

L.D.S. Social Services is a Utah child placing agency

licensed by the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. §55-8a-l, et seq. (Rep.Vol. 6A 1974).

26

3.

Defendants John and Jane Doe are individuals residing

in Salt Lake County whose names are not known to plaintiff but who
are currently exercising custody and control over the infant child
of the plaintiff.
4.

Meche1 Cymone Paxman was born on June 4 # 1987.

She is the natural daughter of Steven Swayne and Penni Jean Paxman.
5.

Prior to the birth of the child, plaintiff had publicly

acknowledged his paternity of the child and had made arrangements
for the child and its mother to reside with his family following
the child's birth.
6.

Plaintiff was present at the birth of the child and

publicly acknowledged his paternity to hospital personnel involved
in the delivery of and care for the child.
7.

Plaintiff visited the mother and child during

each day of their hospitalization.

On June 9, 1987, he received

the child into his home following her discharge from the hospital.
/8.

On June 8, 1987, without notice to plaintiff of

any nature and without his knowledge or consent, Penni Paxman
executed an affidavit and release whereby she purported to release
plaintiff's daughter to the care, custody and control of L.D.S.
Social Services and consented to the placement of the child for
adoption after a placement made in the sole discretion of L.D.S.
Social Services.
9.

After receiving the physical custody of Steven

Swaynefs infant daughter L.D.S. Social Services placed the child

-2-
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for adoption with John and Jane Doe.

Prior to receiving Mr,

Swayne's daughter L.D.S. Social Services was advised of his
paternity and of his lack of consent to any placement for adoption.
10.

John and Jane Doe have petitioned the Third Judicial

District Court of Utah for a Decree of Adoption of Mr. Swayne's
infant daughter.
P>1.

On June 15, 1987 plaintiff filed an acknowledgement

of paternity and willingness to support his infant daughter and
both plaintiff and the child's mother sought to amend the child's
birth certificate to list plaintiff as the child's father and give
her the last name of Swayne.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(42 U.S.C. §1983)
12.

The actions of L.D.S. Social Services and John

and Jane Doe, taken under color of Utah State law by virtue of
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §55-8a-l, et seg. (Rep. Vol.
6A 1974) and Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 (Supp.1986), constitute a
deprivation of plaintiff's liberty interest in maintaining custody,
care and control of his infant daughter in violation of the rights
conferred on plaintiff by virtue of the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
13.

The acts of defendants set forth above are in

violation of the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §1983.

-3-
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment)
14.

The provisions of Utah Code Ann. $78-30-4 (Supp.

1986), both as written and as applied to the facts of this case,
are violative of the Egual Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
of Art. 1 §§7,11, and 24 of the Constitution of Utah.
RELIEF REQUESTED
15.

Plaintiff requests an Order of this Court restoring

him to the custody, care and control of his infant daughter.
16.

Plaintiff further requests a declaration from this

Court that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 (Supp. 1986)
are violative of the United States Constitution and the Constitution
of Utah.
17.

Plaintiff further requests damages in a reasonable

sum from defendant L.D.S. Social Services and his costs in this
action, including reasonable attorneys fees, as provided in 42
U.S.C. §1988.
DATED this7// day of September, 1987.

7V A w i L 4 . / l
M. D^vid Eckersley

<%/ UJLJL.
B i l l ^ V Walker, 3f{
Attorneys for Plaintiff

-4-
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN H. SWAYNE,

:

Plaintiff,

:

VS.

:

L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

:
:
:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
HAROLD BROWN

Civil No. C-87-05969
Judge Homer Wilkinson

)
: SS

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Harold Brown, being first duly sworn, depose and state
as follows:
1.

I am the Director of LDS Social Services.

2.

LDS Social Services is a private, nonprofit welfare

agency licensed by the State of Utah as a qualified child
placement agency pursuant to U.C.A. §55-8a-l et sea.
3.

No governmental agency or entity is involved in the

internal operations, affairs, or decisions of LDS Social

Services, except as expressly authorized by the licensing
statute.
4.

LDS Social Services receives no government funding.

5.

No governmental agency or entity was involved in

Penny Paxman's relinquishment and LDS Social Services'
acceptance of the custody and control of her baby on June 8,
1987, or in the decision to transfer custody and control of the
baby from LDS Social Services to the adoptive parents.
DATED this

day of February, 1988.

Harold Brown

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this^l3gPdav of
February, 1988.
My Commission Empires:
fr -£R -r5r

NOTARY"PUBLIC /
,
Residing in: sJkjy-oT/iJpj

-2-
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN H. SWAYNE,
AFFIDAVIT OF
PENNI JEAN PAXMAN

Plaintiff,
vs.
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE,

Civil No. C-87-05969
Judge Homer Wilkinson

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
SB

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Penni Jean Paxman deposes and states that:
1.

At all times relevant to this action I have resided

with my parents in their home in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

I began dating Steven Swayne in late 1985 and

learned in October of 1986 that I had become pregnant by him.
When I informed Steven that I was pregnant, he became angry and

/?B7

at first denied that the baby was his.

d JJ-0 pUns-itaC
3.

ZI/ZJU

£)&-&</±^4^

/^ ^ • C^NLZ-C-

In approximately Match of 1987, Steven and I

discussed the fact that my parents wanted me to place the baby
O eJ

/-*J>

for adoption-

I called LDS Social Services during that same

month to make an appointment to discuss placing the baby for
adoption, but later decided to postpone the appointment.
4.

Steven never offered to marry me or to live with and

support me and the baby.

He suggested that, if I did keep the

baby, I could live with his mother in her apartment.

It was

understood that I would be expected to support myself and pay
half the rent.
5.

During the time I was dating Steven, I often gave

him money to pay his apartment rent and other expenses.

I knew

that during the time we were dating, both before and during my
pregnancy, Steven was also dating and having sexual relations
with other girls.

I also knew that he had previously fathered a

baby out of wedlock and that the baby had been placed for
adoption.
6.

My baby was born in a Salt Lake City hospital on

June 4, 1987.
hospital.

Steven knew of the birth and visited me in the

During one of Steven's visits to the hospital, I

informed him that in order to have his name entered on the
baby's birth certificate as the father he would have to sign a
paternity form.

I showed the form to Steven but he did not

sign it, and his name was not entered on the birth certificate.
(See attached exhibit.)

On June 6, 1987, my baby and I were

discharged from the hospital and I took the baby home to my

33

parents9 house.

Steven has paid none of the hospital expenses

or expenses to support me and the baby.
7.

On June 8, 1987, I took the baby to LDS Social

Services to receive counseling regarding placing my baby for
adoption.

My parents went with me.

The counselor at LDS Social

Services, Elda Bowen, explained to me the adoption process.
When Mrs. Bowen asked about the baby's father, I explained to
her that Steven had no interest in marriage or in living with
and supporting me and the baby.

Both Mr6. Bowen and my parents

told me that the decision to place the baby for adoption was
mine alone to make.

Mrs. Bowen told me that if I was not sure

about placing the baby for adoption, I -*ould place the baby in
temporary foster care until I made my decision.

After

considering all of the circumstances, such as Steven's lack of
interest in me and the baby, my inability to support and rear
the baby alone, the problems of bringing a racially-mixed baby
into a possible marriage with another man, and the needs of the
baby to have a good home, I decided that it would be best for
the baby to place her for adoption.
8.

Mrs. Bowen reviewed with me the release form and

asked me if I understood what I was doing.

I told her that I

understood the form and its effect and that I wanted to do what
was best for the baby.

I then signed the form releasing the

care and custody of my baby to LDS Social Services.

-3-
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9.

I asked Mrs. Bowen if I could take the baby home

that night and bring her in the next day.

Mrs. Bowen agreed,

and I returned the baby to LDS Social Services the next day.
DATED this £ ^ day of February, 1988.

\^^^2-^<l^/%</>>?
Penni Jean Paxxnan

SUBSCRIBED AND S W O R N to before me this Z2^ day of
February, 1988.
My Commission Expires:
Residing in:

-4-
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SALT LAKI CITT - COUNTT EEALTH DEPARTMENT

DIVISION OF VITAL STATISTICS

.
ES5»ssr It
U.

18 6 7 6 1

f l o l v Crosa

CERTIFICATE OF LIVE 1IRTH
vr«Tt m ufw - mmmmtn o» wt*tm
MWI

Hospital

ia*TlftAT9
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'( Vii.uua.ur ""]»Mn!.JHMhU!rt—u.vu.V
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3641
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN H. SWAYNE,
Plaintiff,

:
:
s

v.

:

L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,

:
:
:
:

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF
ELDA C. BOWEN

C<"<! l.o.

C-87-05969

Judge Homer Wilkinson

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Elda C. Bowen deposes and states that:
1.

I am a resident of the State of Utah.

2.

I am an employee of LDS Social Services, a child

placement agency licensed to receive children for placement or
adoption pursuant to Title 55, Chapter 8a, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
3.

I am employed by LDS Social Services as a social

worker specializing in counseling with unwed mothers.

I have

been employed in this position by LDS Social Services for the
past sixteen years.
9^

4.

Penny Jean Paxman called the Sandy office of LDS

Social Services on March 10, 1987 and made an appointment to
meet with me the next day to discuss possible adoptive placement of the baby she was expecting.

Penny subsequently called

and cancelled the appointment.
5.

Following the birth of Penny's baby, an appoint-

ment was made for me to meet with Penny on June 8, 1987. On
that day, Penny brought the baby with her to my office to
discuss placing the baby for adoption.
also present at that meeting.

Penny's parents were

I inquired about the baby's

father, and Penny told me that he had indicated no interest in
forming a family unit, in supporting the baby, or in planning
for the baby's future.

I explained the adoption process,

stressed to Penny that whether to relinquish the baby was her
decision alone, and informed her that she could place the baby
in temporary foster care until she made her decision.

Penny

decided at that meeting that adoption would be best for the
baby.
6.

During that same meeting, I telephoned the Bu-

reau of Vital Statistics of the Utah Department of Health and
inquired whether an Acknowledgement of Paternity had been
filed for Penny's baby.

I was informed that an Acknowledge-

ment had not been filed.
7.

I then showed a relinquishment form to Penny

entitled "AFFIDAVIT AND RELEASE".
to.)

(Exhibit A, attached here-

I filled in the preliminary information and read aloud

~2~

2«

the entire form from beginning to end as Penny followed
along.

I asked her if she understood the form and the effect

of signing it and was doing so by her own free will and
choice.

She responded affirmatively to those questions and

then signed the form.

After signing, Penny expressed her

relief and her belief that it was the right decision.
8.

Penny asked if she could take the baby home

overnight and return her the next day.

I consented, and Penny

returned the baby to me at my office at 5:00 p.m. on June 9,
1987.

LDS Social Services transferred custody of the baby to

her adoptive parents on June 12, 1987.
DATED this ^ L day of February, 1988.

Elda C. Bowen

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this
February, 1988.

day of

&%.J&J

My Commission Expires:
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I, /^f/2-j x*-^ <y ^/fSi ^ ^ ^^^X/^^1
^ /be i n g first djiy^s*c-n on Cdtr., ae?ose anj :.,
T That" I am the parent: of a minor child, n a me 1 y /&&fo^/£, r / ^Avz yw^*fi ^
born on the
y/i^^/>
day of
i //,^^yA
, 15 £ 7 , at" u ,r z . £
Ccunty o f wf.4 ^
State of
//T/j./i
•
2. That because I feel the child's best interests will be served, I hereby release
said child to the care, custody and control of the LDS Social Services,-for placement for
accption pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated i 55-8a-l et sec. (1953).
3. That I fully understand and am aware of the fact that by my action, I am releas'
and do hereby so release, my parental rights with regard to said child, and in fact, authr
the LDS Social Services to exercise its discretion in the placement of said child.
4. That, further, I do hereby consent to the legal adoption of said child by these
persons whom the said LDS Social Services may, in their discretion, designate and apprc\e
be adopting parents who are able to furnish said child with a proper name, home and care.
5. That I fully understand and consent that the said LDS Social Services may, in it:
discretion, release the care, custody, and control over said minor child to another licerst
child placement agency for adoption and placement within said other agency's discretion,
if this is deemed necessary to serve the best interests of the child.
6. That I hereby waive notice of any and all legal proceedings which may be held in
Courts of the State of Utah, or elsewhere, for the purpose of determination or release
and the adoption of said child or any thereof.
7. That I have read the foregoing statement and I fully understand the impact of
the terms and conditions to which I do agree, and consent; and that my action herein taken
is of my own free will, executed voluntarily without any coercion, force, or duress, anc
without any promises of any kind whatsoever, except that the best interests of said child
tfill be the paramount, controlling factor on its placement.

l i t r . e s s / ) '
/

itress
TATE OF UTAH

Signature o-f Parent

)

OF SALT LAKE )
On the & $ £ day of
0/,^> y
• 19 f / , personally appeared before
' &>^*sn*r
( k f ^ X . ^ g j ^ W
rthTsigne- of the foregoing instrurent, *>r:
.viecgecyca^.e tnat sne/'fie executes tne same.

JU.NTY

Notary PusiIC
crtrrrissicn empires:

',Si* / , /?fy

^

_ "797/^L-^^JL^
Aacress

/.• <T J<s
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN H. SWAYNE,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:

vs.

:

L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN E. BROCKERT

Civil No. C-87-05969
Judge Homer Wilkinson

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
John E. Brockert, being first duly sworn deposes and says
as follows:
1.

I am a director of the Bureau of Vital Records for

the State of Utah.
2.

The revised Utah vital statistics rules which became

effective March 17, 1987, specify in Rule 405-3-4 (attached
hereto as Exhibit "A") that a child born to an unmarried mother
may not have the father's name entered on a birth certificate
unless the mother and father sign an acknowledgment of paternity
(attached hereto as Exhibit "B").
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3.

Rule 3.4 has been in effect since March 17, 1987 and

has been a requirement since 1972 for all births occurring in
the State of Utah.
DATED this 6^3

day of February, 1988.

Fohn E. Brockert, Director of
Vital Records

d day of

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25*
February, 1988.
My romrpission
Expires:
'omrpission Exp

FARY PUB,

Residing i

-2-
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This amendment shall be processed In the manner prescribed In Section 3.2 of
these rules.
Rule 3.4

Acknowledgement of Paternity by Natural Parents

A child born to an unmarried mother may not have the father's name entered on
the birth certificate unless the mother and father sign an acknowledgement of
paternity. If the acknowledgement of paternity 1s signed and received before
the certificate 1s registered, the father's name and other related Information
may be entered 1n the appropriate Items on the original certificate. The
acknowledgement of paternity 1s transmitted with the original certificate to
the State Registrar, where 1t 1s retained as documentary evidence.
An acknowledgement of paternity received after the certificate is registered
1s not acceptable for registration. Alternatively, the father's Information
may be added by amendment as specified 1n Rule 3.2. However, 1f another man
Is shown as the father of the child on the original certificate, the
correction can only be made following a judicial determination of paternity or
following adoption.
RULE 4

Oelayed Registration of Birth (Section 26-2-8)

Rule 4.1

Registration - Ten Oays to One Year

Certificates of birth filed after ten days, but within one year from the date
of birth, shall be registered on the standard birth certificate In the manner
prescribed 1n Section 26-2-5, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. Such
certificate shall not be marked "Delayed."
- 5 -
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Utah State Department of Health

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PATERNITY
BY PARENTS

rVe

and

Father of Child

Mother of Child

lereby acknowledge that

is the natural father
(name of father)

>f the

Sex of Child

.child born

Birthdete

lirthplace

City

Hospitel (or address)

County

Of
Maiden name of mother

Mother's usuel residence

is our desire that the father's information become a part of the birth certificate of our chilo.
ame of Child

^rst

Middle

Last

First

Middle

Lest

ame of Father
ge of Father at time of this child's birth

Father's Birthdate.
Race of Father

rthpiace of Father
gnature (Mother)

Address

I hereby acknowledge paternity of the child identified above. This is to signify my willingness and intent to support this child to the best of my ability.
Address

gnature (Father)
bscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

.19

Signature Notary Public

(SEAL)

Address
My Commission Expires
0HBHS>4$

10/79

AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT XIV
lection 1.
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State ahall make or enforce any law which
ahall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor ahall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I
tec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.

( D A child cannot be adopted without the content of each living parent
having rightt in relation to taid child, except that content it not necetsary
from a father or mother who hat been judicially deprived of the custody of the
child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; provided, that the district
court may order the adoption of any child, without notice to or content in court
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it thall appear that the parent or
parents whose content would otherwise be required have theretofore, in writing, acknowledged before any officer authorised to take acknowledgments,
releaeed hit or her or their control or custody of tuch child to any agency
licented to receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8a, Title
65, and tuch agency contents, in writing, to tuch adoption or whenever it
ahall appear that the parent or parents whose content would otherwite be
required have theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their control,
custody, and all parental lights and interests in such child to any agency
licensed or authorized by statute to receive children for placement or adoption
in any state pursuant to that state's laws and taid agency hat in turn, in
writing, released its control and custody of tuch child to any agency licented
under Chapter 8a, Title 65, or to any person, or persons, selected by that
agency licensed under Utah law, as adoptive parents for said child, and such
Utah agency consents, in writing, to such adoption.
(2) A minor parent shall havetikepower to consent to the adoption of such
parent's child, and a minor parent shall have the power to release tuch parent's control or custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to receive
children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8 [Chapter 8a], Title 55,
and, such a consent or release so executed shall be valid and have the same
force and effect as a consent or release executed by an adult parent. A minor
parent, having so executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the tame upon
tuch parent's attaining the age of majority.
(3) (a) A person who is the father or claims to be the father of an illegitimate child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child by
registering with the registrar of vital statistics in the department of
health, a notice of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and of his
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability. The
department of health shall provide forms for the purpose of registering
the notices, and the forms shall be made available through the department and in the office of the county clerk in every county in this state.
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the birth of the child but must
be registered prior to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished or
placed with an agency licensed to provide adoption tervicet or prior to the
filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has placed the child
for adoption. The notice ahall be signed by the registrant and ahall include his name and address, the name and last known address of the
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and
year of the expected birth of the child. The department of health ahall
maintain a confidential registry for this purpose.
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file and register his notice of
claim to paternity and his agreement to support the child ahall be barred
from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his paternity of the child. Such failure shall further constitute an abandonment of
said child and a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of or to a
hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of taid child, and the
content of tuch father to the adoption of tuch child thall not be required.
(d) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to an illegitimate child, if
there it no showing that the father has consented to the proposed adoption, it ahall be necessary to file with the court prior to the granting of a
decree allowing the adoption a certificate from the department of health,
signed by the state registrar of vital statistics which certificate ahall state
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from fathers of illegitimate children and that no registration has been found
pertaining to the father of the illegitimate child in question.

78-30-12. Adoption by acknowledgment
The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own,
receiving it as such with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his
family, and otherwise treating it at if it were a legitimate child, thereby
adopts it as such, and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimatefromthe time of its birth. Theforegoingprovisions of this chapter do not
apply to such an adoption.
/\ £

